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Abstract
Authenticating to an online service is usually done by providing a
username and password in some protected form so that the server can
verify that those credentials correspond to a registered identity authorised
for access. For the average Internet user, managing one’s online identities is
challenging. Nearly every password protected web service advises its users
to come up with a sufficiently complex password, which is not to be used
elsewhere. As the number of associations with online services increases,
so too does the number of online identities that the user has to remember.
Identity overload is one of the greatest challenges for Internet users. The
result may be that the user reuses difficult passwords for those of his online
accounts that protect high value information, and uses passwords that are
easily remembered (and easily guessed) for the protection of lower value
information.
The main goal of this thesis is to investigate local user-centric identity
management and propose a simple, secure and user friendly authentication
mechanism. The mechanism relies on an external offline personal
authentication device called “OffPAD”, which acts as a trusted platform
external to the terminal. From this device, the user may authenticate to
services and manage his online identities. We argue that the approach of
handling critical actions on an external secure device provides increased
security and usability with regard to both the authentication process itself,
as well as the storage and handling of identities.
The OffPAD device can be used to automatically authenticate its
holder to any supported web service to which he or she is registered.
We will present an extension of the HTTP Digest Access Authentication
scheme that facilitates unobtrusive and automated authentication, while
still adhering to password policies. We will look at how we can increase
security and suggest improvements for modernizing the (ageing) digest
authentication standard in particular, with regard to storage and handling
of credentials. We will also discuss how identity management can be more
user-centric, thus user friendly, alleviating the cognitive load of managing
passwords.
HTTP Digest Access Authentication is used as the authentication
scheme in every example and in the prototype implementation. It was
selected for its simplicity, extendibility and abilities: especially its ability to
function with both clear text and hashed user credentials at the endpoints.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Local user-centric identity management can alleviate the pains related to
identity exhaustion at the individual level [18]. The number of identities
an internet surfer accumulates on the web quickly exceeds the number of
identities she can keep track of on her own. This is a classic problem of bad
usability, often leading the user to circumvent best practice: writing down
passwords or reusing the same password for many services [2].
A sufficiently disconnected and secured external device can be used
to make management of identities more efficient, secure, and scalable
for each user. Such a device can work as both a local user-centric
identity management system and an automatic authenticator. Bundled
with implementations of the appropriate authentication algorithms, it
is able to manage every one of the user’s online identities, and at the
same time automatically authenticate the user to his associated services.
This device is called an OffPAD, a mostly offline Personal Authentication
Device, with capabilities such as automatic authentication and secure
identity management. Letting the device handle this work relieves the
user of the mental strain of password management and will in most
cases completely remove the time penalty associated with user interaction
during authentication. Also, as authentication is done from an external
device and the procedure passes only protected information through the
client computer, no password or critical data is exposed in clear text on the
computer screen or in the memory of the client. This, of course, requires
authentication schemes that do not transfer plain text passwords. In an
ideal situation, the holder of the described OffPAD device will never need
to manage any of her credentials, or at any point know more than a single
password, namely that which unlocks the device.
1.2 Research questions
The problems addressed in this thesis are related to identity management,
access control and security usability. The main problem is that of password
fatigue, described in [18, 15]. Another issue with contemporary password
1
Figure 1.1: High-level research progress
schemes is that they require the user to enter his password on his computer
through the keyboard, exposing the password in local memory (see figure
2.4). Theoretically, malware can examine memory segments of a web
browser and extract the password entered. A more widespread threat is
that of keylogging, where each keystroke is logged as the user is typing.
This concern is expressed and discussed in detail in [21].
We will also investigate whether original passwords1 are still needed
when identity management happens at a device rather than in the brain of
the user. In chapter 5 we elaborate on password protection and argue that
with our proposed authentication scheme, passwords (as they are used in
the original scheme) are obsolete.
Below we list a selection of important questions that will be assessed
during the thesis and ultimately concluded in chapter 6:
1. What opportunities does the OffPAD offer?
2. What has already been done in the field of local user-centric identity
management?
3. What security requirements must be considered for a contemporary
user authentication scheme?
4. What is the state of HTTP Digest Access Authentication?
1.3 Process and scientific method
The work carried out in this thesis project has been done loosely following
an iterative and incremental development practice, both for the develop-
ment of the software and writing the report. The software product has
been followed up by the LUCIDMAN project through its monthly team
meetings. A sketch of the software was defined early, but many adjust-
ments were made throughout the period. In the early stages of the process,
planning and requirement analysis was done while investigating the limits
and possibilities of the provided hardware (TazCard2). A working proto-
type, able to authenticate a user to an HTTP Digest Authentication pro-
tected server was presented on March 15, 2012, at a LUCIDMAN project
meeting in Caen, France.
In the third quarter of 2012, it was decided to discontinue the
development of the TazCard application and work toward deploying the
1I.e. passwords that are made up by the user alone, and that he has to remember.
2The TazCard is a Java enabled handheld device produced by French TazTag.
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authentication system on another device, the TazPhone. However, because
of delays in production of the TazPhone device, no working prototype was
finished within the time frame of the thesis work.
1.4 Scope
This thesis’ main topics are secure identity management, user authentica-
tion and authentication mechanisms. In particular, we focus on the imple-
mentation of an automatic authentication service for HTTP Digest Access
Authentication and discuss its qualities. The software developed as part of
the thesis work (described in chapter 4) is limited to work with the HTTP
Digest Access Authentication specified in RFC 2617 [9] and the security ex-
tension of this algorithm, which we propose in chapter 5. Theoretically, the
OffPAD device will be able to handle authentication by all schemes that
rely on client-server communication.
1.4.1 Assumptions and restrictions
We restrict our view of HTTP Digest Access Authentication in that we
do not support backwards compatibility with earlier (more vulnerable)
versions of the algorithm3. The MD5-sess authentication mechanism and
integrity protected authentication (auth-int) are also not considered, for
brevity. We also assume that server authentication (authentication by
the user of the server) is not a concern – this thesis focuses on user
authentication only. We thus assume and rely on that the identity of the
remote server is correct. Concerns of server authentication are addressed
within the LUCIDMAN project by Kent Varmedal in [41]. Further, as
a consequence of our client-side focus, we do not use or consider the
AuthenticationInfo header (or its contained information) that is passed
to the client upon successful authentication; neither in this report or the
software solutions. This header is originally used for notifying the user
agent (the web browser) that authentication was successful.
1.5 Related work
There are a number of devices developed in the field of identity manage-
ment, each covering a portion (but not all) of the proposed OffPAD. In [23]
Singer and Laurie take position on how the identity management prob-
lem should be handled, and present requirements for a device to alleviate
identity overload, similar to the OffPAD device. Below we present some
of the identity management and authenticator devices that are similar to
the OffPAD. In section 2.2.4 we present the OffPAD and in section 3.2 we
describe how the OffPAD differs from the other, similar devices.
3RFC2617 offers backwards compatibility with the less protected RFC2069, and a
compromised server may advertise support for other less secure schemes.
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1.5.1 The Pico
In [35], Frank Stajano introduced the Pico, a small device facilitating user
authentication to any supporting service, both online and offline, both in a
network context and “real life”. This makes the Pico equally applicable in
authenticating its user to a burglar alarm, Facebook or a point of sale.
Imagine we could afford to start again from scratch, without
concerns for backwards compatibility, and that our primary
directive were to invent a user authentication method that no
longer relied on users having to remember unguessable secrets.
[... The Pico] is presented as a clean-slate solution, without
regard for backwards compatibility. [35]
The OffPAD does not attempt to range as far as the Pico with regard
to heterogeneity of services. In turn, the OffPAD scheme benefits from
that it does not demand any radical server-side changes to function. The
differences between the OffPAD and Pico designs are thoroughly discussed
in section 3.2.1.
1.5.2 Nebuchadnezzar
Nebuchadnezzar, or the Neb, is a 2008 idea by Singer and Laurie. In [23]
they argue that attempting to establish a trusted path of communication
between a “general purpose” operating system and a server is a bad idea. It
is not possible to assume a that a client running a general purpose operating
system is sufficiently secured. They also present another unreasonable
extreme: trying to do all of one’s everyday computing on a minimal,
secured, locked down operating system. They argue that the only sensible
solution to secure computing is a combination of the two: a compromise
between highly secure and highly usable. The position paper further
describes the schematics behind a trusted device, the Nebuchadnezzar,
which much like the OffPAD is an external device, maximally reduced with
regard to features. The OffPAD may be seen as a physical implementation
of the Nebuchadnezzar, with an even narrower (or more specialized) set
of functions. In section 3.2.2 we elaborate on the differences between the
OffPAD and the Neb.
1.5.3 MP-Auth
In 2010, Mannan and Oorschot [26] presented the MP-Auth (or Mobile
Password Authentication) protocol. A solution for moving password
authentication (and not the passwords themselves) to a personal device,
protecting them against being collected by malware. In this protocol, a
direct SSL tunnel is established between the user’s mobile phone and the
server to which he will authenticate. The user’s password or credential is
then entered on the phone and transmitted, protected by the SSL tunnel, to
the server, authenticating the user [26]. The MP-Auth solution relays the
communication and entering of a password to a mobile phone, but does
not provide the benefit of identity management.
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1.5.4 The commercial state of the art
Some devices are complete identity managers, letting the user manage
his credentials on the device, but without the ability to authenticate
directly to his services. Some are authenticator tokens, using possession
of the device as an authenticating factor4. Below, we discuss the current
commercial state of the art in user-centric identity management. Table 1.1
shows a comparison. At the time of writing, there are no commercial
devices sufficiently matching the description of an OffPAD, and no physical
implementations of the Nebuchadnezzar described in [23].
Name Created / Issued by Category R
bUnit Bloomberg L.P. A 7
Mandylion token Mandylion Research Labs, LLC IdM X
YubiKey yubico A(MF) X
Browser / SW password manager Various IdM+A X
Online password managers Various IdM+A X
BankID FNO (Finance Norway) A(MF) 7
SecurID RSA A(MF) 7
A = Authenticator | IdM = Identity Manager | MF = Part of multi factor mechanism | R =
Reconfigurable
Table 1.1: Current commercial authentication and identity management
devices
bUnit
The bUnit5 is an authentication token made specifically for customers of
Bloomberg Professional. Using its embedded fingerprint scanner, the user
can authenticate to Bloomberg’s Professional service from any computer,
thus providing their customers with mobility between terminals.
Mandylion Token
Mandylion Research Labs developed their Token following standards and
regulations by NIST, NSA and the US Military [25]. The Token can be
used as an identity manager for up to 50 usernames (or account names)
and password pairs. It should be noted that the Token has an upper limit
of 14 characters per password. The Token is not an authenticator device,
but is reconfigurable in that its contained passwords can be modified. The
functionality of the Token is limited to presenting an authenticated owner
with the contained password. It does not do authentication, but relieves
password fatigue and advocates against reuse of passwords.
YubiKey
YubiKey is a popular device for user authentication. It is mainly an OTP
code generator, sending transient passwords to YubiKey supported web
4I.e. “something you have”.
5http://bloomberg.com/bunit/
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sites. The YubiKey has several other applications, such as storing a static
password, challenge-response, etc. As the YubiKey is only capable of
storing a single password at a time, we do not consider it an identity
management device.
Browser password managers
All contemporary browsers have some sort of password management
service. These are recognizable by their inquiring the user to “remember
this password”. They are able to store passwords for most of the common
username and password schemes, such as HTTP authentication. Some
automatically fill in HTML forms. While most are lacking in their quality
of protection, many allow a master password to be set, thus allowing
encryption of the password storage. Thus, any Firefox identity store
not protected by a master password can be collected by a Trojan or
other malware, and the passwords can be decrypted at another location.
However, the quality of protection provided by a master password is as
usual dependent on the quality of that master password. Mounting brute
force or other guessing attacks is trivial.
Software password managers
Software password managers such as LastPass6 work in the same way as
browser password managers in that they store passwords either on the
user’s computer or at their own online location. While still only requiring a
master password to unlock every password, these services usually provide
additional protection. LastPass generates a master encryption key for
protection of the managed passwords. This master key is generated with
the PBKDF2 key derivation function using SHA-256. Key derivation
functions are discussed in section 2.3.1. It is worth noting that while the
PBKDF2 specification in RFC 2898 suggests 1000 iterations of the KDF one
way function as an absolute minimum, LastPass only uses 500 iterations [20,
22]. Also, as managed passwords are released to the computer upon use,
they may be read from memory in clear text (see figure 2.4 and [21] for
details).
BankID
BankID is an effort to make online banking in Norway easier and
more secure. It is developed by Nets and is through the organization
Finansnæringens Fellesorganisasjon (FNO), owned by 180 Norwegian banks.
A BankID member bank may issue their customer a BankID OTP device,
that he can use as an additional authentication factor when authenticating
himself to the issuer bank, and to other member banks with which he has
a customer relationship. The BankID OTPs are also used for other actions
originally requiring written consent, such as entering a loan agreement,
applying for credit cards, and the like. The digital signatures provided
6https://lastpass.com/
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to such as transactions or agreements apply non-repudiation and message
authentication to these.
SecurID
SecurID comprises several products which are all OTP authentication
tokens. A SecurID token authenticates the holder to one service, to which
the token is configured. Some SecurID tokens have other functionality as
well, such as challenge-response authentication and email signing.
1.6 Organization of the report
Chapter 2 explains technical details needed for understanding the software
systems and the later discussions. The most important theories discussed
in this report are identity management (section 2.2) and HTTP Digest Ac-
cess Authentication (section 2.5). A thorough presentation of cryptographic
hash functions and key derivation functions (KDF) is given in section 2.3.
In chapter 3 we discuss the problems presented in section 1.2, and
give various solutions, weighing them against each other. We conclude
by arguing on why the chosen solutions are the preferred ones and what
their limitations are, if any.
Given the technical background from chapter 2 and the overview
of the project from chapter 3, we use chapter 4 to exhibit the software
implementations and discuss them in detail.
To ensure the quality of the software implementation with regard
to security, the software has been scrutinized through several prototype
stages. Details of the security tests are presented in chapter 5, along with
suggestions on how to secure operation and the consequential steps taken.
Chapter 5 is not intended as a total overview and solution to all of the
scheme’s weaknesses.
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and raises some open issues and ideas
that may fit for future research.
1.7 The LUCIDMAN project
The LUCIDMAN project7 is a 2011-2013 Franco-Norwegian research
project on security usability. Below is a short presentation of the
collaborators and their expertize/contributions to the LUCIDMAN project:
The objective [of LUCIDMAN] is to investigate the security and
the usability aspects for client side management of user and ser-
vice provider identities. The project will investigate an identity
management model which can provide enhancements to secur-
ity challenges associated with poor usability and scalability of
managing identities on the client side [38].
7LUCIDMAN is an abbreviation of Local user-centric Identity Management.
7
Vallvi AS
Vallvi is a Norwegian company that focuses on consulting and business
development in the ICT sector. In the LUCIDMAN project, Vallvi
contributes with management and business development.
ENSICAEN GREYC
GREYC is a research laboratory at École Nationale Supérieure d’Ingénieurs
de Caen (ENSICAEN). With over 220 members GREYC represent know-
ledge in a wide variety of fields such as computer security; identification
(biometrics etc.); microelectronics; algorithms. Their research group E-
payment & Biometrics is a contributor to the project with knowledge on au-
thentication, privacy and electronic payments. French CEV is a developer
of customer loyalty solutions using smart cards, magnetic cards, contact-
less devices, etc. Contributions of CEV include integration of an identity
selector, into the identity management system.
TazTag
TazTag is a French developer of secure contactless devices such as the TPH-
ONE Android mobile phone, the TazCard handheld device, and the TazPad
tablet. These devices are enabled for confidential communication and a
god fit for the security requirements of the applications developed in the
project. Thus, TazTag contribute with devices, API and documentation for
application and prototype development.
Tellu
Tellu is a Norwegian software company working on mobile solutions. They
provide UI design, prototyping and testing of the project’s applications.
Department of Informatics, University of Oslo
The Department of Informatics at UiO has a wide field of research with a
growing interest in information security. Lead by Dr. Audun Jøsang, the
UiO group of the LUCIDMAN project will contribute with two Master’s
theses on security and usability: “Cognitive entity authentication with
Petname systems” by Kent Varmedal [41], and the thesis of this report.
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Chapter 2
Background material
This chapter is intended as an introduction to the most important theories,
covering technologies and methods mentioned and exemplified in this
report.
2.1 Terminology
2.1.1 Authentication
Entity authentication is the act of an entity1, in which it proves its identity
to a system (the verifier) by providing it with sufficient information for that
system to substantiate its veracity. An entity is usually assigned certain
privileges or authorizations, for which it must be authenticated to exercise
by.
For the entity to be able to authenticate, it must first be registered with
the verifier. Ordinarily for web services, a set of credentials is supplied
by the user when he first registers to the service – so-called leap-of-faith
authentication [3], or TOFU, Trust On First Use. Registration under the
TOFU principle is a critical action in that the credentials supplied in the
registration phase provide the highest level of assurance that the system
can ever have in the user’s authenticity. In this case, the verifier knows
nothing else than that the user, upon authenticating, is the same one that
once registered. It must trust that the credentials supplied reflect the true
identity of the user. On the other far end, banks may require that their
customers register by providing a physical proof of identity, such as a
passport or other national means of identity, even meeting up in person.
Here, the identity is already established in a national registry and provides
a higher assurance of correct identity upon registration. Following, each
authentication will provide, at most, the assurance with which the user
registered.
1An entity is either a person, organization or object (such as a file, directory or data unit)
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2.1.2 TOCTOU
Time Of Check / Time Of Use (TOCTOU) in authentication describes the
distinction between two events in access control. The time of check is the
instant in which the identity of some entity is verified by the system.
The time of use is the instant in which the access control system looks
up the authenticated identity in the access policy and approves access if
the identity is authorized. If the two events are separated in time, the
Authentication Assurance Level (AAL) is lower at the time of use than if
they are sequentially and atomically executed. The time between check
and use can be called ∆TOCTOU.
As an example, consider the verification of bank transactions, or the
requirement to re-authenticate upon password changes in most systems.
These are situations where the TOCTOU principle holds. The access control
system’s assurance of the authenticated identity has dropped below the
level demanded and the system must be reassured in order to execute
the critical action. In scenarios where a user is logged in to a system,
that system can only be certain of the user’s identity at the time of his
authentication (time of check), as an adversary may overtake the session,
e.g. if the authenticated user has left the system without logging out of his
session.
2.1.3 Continuous authentication
Through continuous authentication, the system can be certain of the
entity’s identity through an entire authenticated session or every time
authentication is required. It enables the authentication system to be
stateless, i.e. a user is not either logged in, or logged out. Rather, the system
is in a state of constant doubt – the AAL is low. The system can be reassured
of the entity’s authenticity either steadily (e.g. through biometrics, such
as in [29]2) or at regular intervals (e.g. re-authenticating after a time out
or when needed (at the time of use)). The apparent benefit of continuous
authentication is that since being confirmed throughout the session, the
system’s AALa is higher over time.
2.1.4 Authorization and access control
Authorization is the act of defining an access policy for an entity’s access
to an object3. Access policies define what are the entity’s capabilities in
the system, i.e. what protected objects or realms of protected objects that
the entity is entitled access to. Authorization may be specified using the
common file system permissions (read, write, execute, append) or more
intricate permission systems, such as the Bell-La Padula model.
Access control is the enforcing of an access policy on a system. The
access policy usually defines either a discretionary or mandatory access
2The author presents this technology in http://youtu.be/pqtZyTyBB7k.
3Here, entity may be interpreted as several entities, such as a group of entities sharing a
role (role-based access control) or a common set of rules (rule-based access control).
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control. In a system enforcing discretionary access control (DAC), the
access control is done at the discretion of the owner of the data. This way, if
a subject (e.g. a user or system) creates an object (e.g. a text document) on a
system, he becomes its owner and delegates access (i.e. authorizes access)
to that object for other subjects as he sees fit. Authorizations are delegated
to identities or groups, making DAC identity based access control.
In a mandatory access control (MAC) policy, there is one access
policy for the entire system and authorizations are delegated based on an
object’s security label. This makes mandatory access control particularly
applicable to military structured systems, where objects may be labelled
“confidential”, “top secret”, etc. [10], and discretionary access control
applicable to systems with a flat hierarchy.
The phases of access control and the relationship between the terms
authorization, access control, access approval and authentication is emphasized
in figure 2.1.
• Registration phase
– Registration – Identifying an entity based on provided
attributes.
– Provisioning – Creating a (system-) unique identity for
the entity and collecting the corresponding authentication
factor.
– Authorization – Defining and persisting an access policy
entry, describing the user’s access rights.
• Operation phase
– Identification – Collecting the identifiers of an entity, map-
ping it to a digital identity.
– Authentication – Having the entity prove that it is the owner
of the assumed identity.
– Access approval – Acting on the authenticated user’s
authorization (“opening the gate”).
• Termination phase
– De-registration – Removal of the digital identity from the
access control system.
– Revocation – Modifying the access policy to no longer
contain entries on the de-registered user.
Adapted from [16].
Figure 2.1: The phases of access control
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SP perspective User perspective
User ID 1A 1B
Server ID 2A 2B
[16]
Table 2.1: The four processes of identity management
2.2 Identity management
Identity management covers all aspects of the creation, use, storage and
revocation of digital identities. A digital identity describes, and maps
uniquely to, an entity. The digital identity is usually referenced by
a username, or other attributes that alone, or in assembly are unique,
distinguishing the entity from others. In biometric authentication, the
attributes of the entity are attributes of the actual owner, i.e. finger print.
Figure 2.2 describes some attributes that can be used to uniquely identify a
business (name and registration number) and a person (name, height, iris
pattern, voice and fingerprint). Note that in biometric user authentication,
the biometric attributes of the user may be used for both identification
and authentication, i.e. the biometric data acts both as identifier and
authentication factor.
In [16], Jøsang presents four different processes of identity manage-
ment: two from the perspective of the service provider (category A, or
server-centric identity management) and two from the perspective of the user
(category B, or user-centric identity management). Both the service provider
and the user have a notion of managing user identities and server identities
at their location (see table 2.1).
From the service provider’s point of view, managing users’ identities
(type 1A) is usually done by a customer relationship management system
(CRM), or in smaller systems simpler access control systems. These
identities are often system unique, complicating the users’ management
of their own online identities (type 1B) which normally spreads across an
infeasible number of services. Type 1B is an important topic of this thesis,
historically a much overlooked topic.
Type 2A describes the service provider’s management of its own
identity(-ies). On the Internet, a server’s identity is its URL, sometimes
coupled with a public key (in an X.509 certificate) for encrypted access,
and server authentication through hierarchical validation of that public
key. Each user’s handling of remote services’ identities usually happens
through the browser, or by the user as proposed in [37], following the
Petname systems.
2.2.1 The silo model
The simplest and most straightforward model of identity management is
the silo model. Credentials of all users are centrally stored at the identity
provider’s servers, and at login time, the credentials that the user supplies
are validated against local records. Using the silo model, every user must
have a separate identity at each identity provider’s “silo”.
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Figure 2.2: Attributes (identifiers) of two entities
2.2.2 The federated model
Proving cumbersome to the user, some identity providers improve on
usability by merging their identity silos into an identity federation, where
identities are shared between many identity providers, providing cross-
domain validity. This is done in agreement between the affected identity
providers. In most cases the identity is first registered at the federated
identity provider and authentication happens on the service provider’s
location using the federated identity provider’s authentication API.
The federated model is a means to alleviate the obvious usability
problem of the silo model: the number of identities. Where the silo
model is autonomous in its realm, the federated model strives generality.
Federated identity providers aim to create a digital identity that is
portable over multiple heterogeneous services: that the owner is eligible
for authenticating to different service providers by the same federated
credentials. Authorization to federated identity management systems is
done based on a shared set of access policies.
Single Sign-On
Single Sign-On (SSO) differs from the federated model in that it is the
authentication process that is portable, rather than only the identity. When
authenticated by Single Sign-On, a user is automatically approved access
to all the protected realms he enters, based on the shared identity’s
authorizations. The user usually authorizes the services to utilize the SSO
capability of the identity provider to which he is registered. When such
a service employs an external federated identity provider, authentication
happens at that identity provider’s location. As an example, Google
Account provides SSO capabilities for all Google’s internal services, such
as GMail, Google Play, etc. and the user’s Google identity can be federated
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across e.g. the Stack Exchange network. The federated Google identity may
then used by the Stack Overflow web server to authenticate the user over
the entire Stack Exchange Network (of which Stack Overflow is a part).
That is, the user is SSO signed on to the Stack Exchange network with his
federated Google identity.
Federation of heterogeneous services and companies in particular has
never really taken off, probably due to the trust issues that arise when an
identity is shared between service providers.
One can argue that identity providers such as Google, Facebook
(Connect) and OpenID have had a huge impact on identity federation
for large niche applications such as comment fields on online newspapers
and message boards. However, these services are rather similar and
not reaching across heterogeneous domains or domains requiring a high
level of authentication assurance. Using Facebook identities on a hospital
computer to access patients’ journals will definitely be considered an
inadequate solution, now and in the future.
2.2.3 Local user-centric identity management
Normal user-centric identity management requires that the user remem-
bers each identity on his own. Consequentially, writing down or reusing
secret credentials are common problems [1]. As there is no reason to be-
lieve that there will ever be one unique online identity per Internet user, one
could try to solve the problem locally.
Figure 2.3: Identity federation
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Figure 2.4: A password exposed in memory
Storing identities on a secured device is a possible solution. In [17]
Jøsang and Pope describe the Personal Authentication Device (PAD), a
secure device that is “mostly decoupled” from the computer. The PAD is
used as an identity management system 4 to which the user authenticates
once (with a PIN number, passphrase or similar). For one session5 on
the PAD, the user can authenticate to every supported remote service
automatically. This is done by securely transmitting the credentials or proof
of credentials between the PAD and the server.
2.2.4 OffPAD
In [15], Jøsang describes a more secure PAD, the OffPAD. The OffPAD is
a personal authentication device (PAD) that is sufficiently disconnected
(Off line). By reducing the device’s connectivity, a decreased number of
attack vectors follow. This decoupling from networks improves security
on the device, as it is less vulnerable to outside attacks.
Critical for an OffPAD is that the transfer of information from the
PAD to the ultimate destination is done securely. An improvement over
authentication using the computer directly is that in the latter case the
password is written through the keyboard and exposed in memory, while
with the OffPAD, credentials are protected with a one-way function before
moving out of the device. In figure 2.4 we show a password as exposed in
a web browser’s memory.
As a side note, consider the amount of attack vectors in a mobile
4type 1B and 2B in table 2.1
5Or some limited amount of time.
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Figure 2.5: A possible OffPAD design
phone, which is (and strives to be) extremely feature-rich. Consequently (in
addition to its widespread use, of course), the mobile phone is becoming a
vulnerable platform [19] and thus cannot be used securely in conjunction
with our software. Below are some suggestions for an OffPAD presented
in [21]. We will describe mobile phone implementations of the OffPAD
further in section 2.2.5.
1. Limited connectivity - we suggest NFC or other physically activated
communication (contactless).
2. Secure element - an infrastructure for secure messaging and storage
such as described in ISO 7816-46.
3. Access control by PIN number or password protection, restricting
unauthorized access to the device. For additional device protection
(two-factor authentication) a combination of biometrics and an access
code can be used.
2.2.5 Using a Mobile Phone as the OffPAD
The current trend of mobile phone malware strongly indicates that the
mobile phone is joining the computer as a vulnerable platform. "In 2011,
the Juniper MTC identified a 155 percent increase in mobile malware across all
platforms, as compared to the previous year" [19]. The number of features
in mobile phones, especially connectivity features, increase the number
of attack vectors, thus the overall attack surface of the device. In light
of this trend, which we assume will not turn to the better, we deem the
OffPAD application unfit for implementation of a mobile phone operating
system. As Singer and Laurie argue in [23], there is no way to establish a
trusted path between a general purpose operating system (which we from
6http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue_catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=
36134
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the above trend assume that the mobile phone is, or is becoming) and a
server.
As a counterexample, the French company TazTag which specializes
in secure contactless devices are developing a mobile phone (TPH-ONE)7
which is said to be able to separate the secure element from the phone’s
operating system (Android), in having a secure state, that can be toggled on
or off physically by the user when required. The secure state is a security
context in which the phone works with the secure element only. The secure
element is capable of handling encryption, and hashing of the credentials
used for authentication. In this scenario, the phone is an OffPAD whenever
it is in the secure state.
2.3 Cryptographic hash functions
A cryptographic hash function is a one-way function in which a value (bit
string) of arbitrary length is converted to another value from a smaller set of
values (commonly between 160 and 512 bit). The output of a hash function
is usually called a digest or a hash (code/value), and is used to identify
and differentiate between different data. Hash values can be presented as
H(x) = y, where H is the hash function, x is the value being hashed and y is
the resulting hash. Hash functions are used in data consistency; password
based user authentication; distributed hash tables; message authentication;
digital signatures; challenge-response protocols, etc.
A hash function must satisfy at least the following requirements [27]:
Ease of computation
Given some x, it is easy to compute H(x).
Compression
The hash function H maps input values x of arbitrary length to output
values H(x) of the same fixed length.
Preimage resistance
For a specified hash code y, find its preimage. A preimage, x, is the value
that is used to produce the hash code y or any other value that produces the
same y, i.e. in H(x) == H(x′) == y, x 6= x′, both x and x′ are preimages
of y. A preimage can be used to counterfeit message authentication codes
(MAC’s), or recover a password from a hashed password file. Preimage
attacks violate the hash function’s one-way characteristic. For a one-way
function to be preimage resistant, it must be computationally hard8 to find
a preimage.
7http://taztag.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=104
8The term hard in cryptography refers to calculations that are infeasible to execute on
today’s most powerful computer systems and where a brute force attack usually is the most
effective solution.
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Figure 2.6: Counterfeit digital signatures
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Additionally, a general purpose hash function must be resistant to the
following attacks:
Second preimage
For a specified preimage x, find another preimage x′, i.e. find a value
such that H(x) == H(x′), x 6= x′. This attack may be used for creating
counterfeit authenticated documents or X.509 certificates for web sites or
software (applications, drivers, etc.). Resistance to such an attack is also
called weak collision resistance and is the most difficult attack.
Collision
For a random preimage x, find another random x′ such that H(x) ==
H(x′), x 6= x′. Collision attacks are only exploitable in situations where
the attacker has some degree of control over, and flexibility in choosing
input values.
Consider a scenario with a high number of documents that are
semantically equivalent9 and another set of such documents where the
contents of each of the second set’s documents carry a message with an
entirely different meaning than in the first set. If a collision attack can
be lead in such a way that the result is that one document’s hash code is
equal to that of another document which carries another (possibly adverse)
message, the digital signature of either document is equal to the other,
falsely verified documents can be produced. See figure 2.6 for an example
in which collisions are used to create fraudulent X.509 PKI certificates for
SSL/TLS communication. Resistance to this attack is also called strong
collision resistance, as both preimages are randomly selected. Thus, it is more
likely to succeed than a second preimage attack.
In [27, sec. 9.3.4], Menezes et al. argue that the ideal computational
security level (the number of attempts needed for a successful attack) for
a collision resistant hash function is 2L/2 and 2L for both preimage and
second preimage attacks. In the last two, the attacker is constrained by his
requirement to find a specific preimage. This is not the case in collisions,
where any preimage is sufficient.
2.3.1 Key Derivation Functions
Ordinary hash functions have many applications. Many problems are
solved from the hash function’s ability to quickly convert large amounts
of data into a fixed size value, uniquely identifying the data. Version
control systems, digital signatures and data comparison are among the
applications that benefit from the speed of these highly efficient functions.
When hashing a password for use in user authentication, for example using
the MD5 hash function, the calculation itself is done in an incredibly short
9I.e. carries the same message, but each with different wording.
19
Figure 2.7: Basic Access Authentication
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amount of time. If the intention is turned around, however, it is easy
to see how fast a brute force attack may be carried out. In 2012, Jeremi
Gosney reported brute force attacks using the MD5 function measuring
up to 180 billion calculations per second. The attacks were carried out
on five clustered servers, connecting 25 GPUs in total [12]. This means
that the character space containing all 95 printable ASCII characters up to
a length of eight characters (i.e. 95
9−1
94 − 1), or about 6.7 quadrillion character
combinations, can be calculated10,11 within a little over ten hours.
6704780954517120
180000000000
= 37248, 78 seconds u 10, 3 hours. (2.1)
Because of the effectiveness seen in brute force and dictionary attacks
against hash functions, the need to slow them down was introduced [28].
Several thousand iterations of MD5 can slow down the calculation enough
to mitigate most brute force attacks. The Password Based Key Derivation
Functions (PBKDF1 and PBKDF2) [20] were introduced by RSA in 2000,
but do not explicitly mention user authentication. bcrypt by Provos and
Mazières (1999), and the more current scrypt by Colin Percival (2012) [30],
however, specifically have user authentication in mind. Common to all
key derivation functions is that they are heavier to calculate, thus provide
a stronger protection to the password they protect. The PBKDF functions
are used mainly to facilitate password based encryption by generating a
key from a password, but every one-way key derivation function may
also be used for user authentication. It is up to the identity provider to
determine the workload of each hash calculation. Despite the long history
of Key Derivation Functions, they have become popular only recently for
storing passwords. By slowing the hash calculation down, each user’s
authentication may take tens, or even a few hundred milliseconds to
perform, but this also applies for each attacker, who must use the same
amount of time for each guessing attempt.
KDF(Key, Salt, Iteration) = DerivedKey (2.2)
Servers protected by the original digest authentication scheme advertise
their supported one-way function algorithms to the client in the algorithm
field of the challenge. This enables servers to provide support of several
others than the two algorithms specified in the standard (MD5 and MD5-
sess). Advertising a KDF at the server side will benefit both the server
and the client with additional protection of the password at both sides. If
the algorithm used is implemented consistently (i.e. calculates the exact
same values) at both endpoints, any one-way function or KDF should be
transparently applicable to the authentication scheme.
Using KDFs not only protect the user credentials in transmit, they
provide the same benefits to either communicating entity storing the
10Here we assume that there are no characters of length zero (we subtract 950 = 1 from
the original geometric sum formula). This leaves us with the expression 958 + 957 + ... + 951.
11Amusingly, the set of ten letter passwords alone takes ten and a half years to calculate
with the same speed. The calculation from equation 2.1 would take over four years on a
desktop PC (assuming 50 million calculations per second).
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credentials locally (i.e. the server and OffPAD). If a password database
is breached, and the stored passwords are hashed by single MD5, and even
salted, most passwords are recoverable in a reasonable amount of time.
If the passwords are protected by a KDF and a reasonable workload is
applied, brute force attacks will not be feasible. If a KDF uses 100 ms on a
specific system to hash a dictionary password12, it follows that the attacker
requires over two hours on average to iterate a 150.000 word dictionary
and locate the correct one, on the same system. Thus, KDFs provide better
protection, even for poorly chosen passwords. Keep in mind that it may be
reasonable to assume that the attacker is in possession of a much stronger
system.
2.4 Basic Access Authentication
The Digest Access Authentication scheme, which is the inspiration of this
thesis, the standard supported by the software implementation and the
example in all use cases, is best explained by first elaborating its origin,
HTTP Basic Access Authentication (short: Basic authentication). It is a
scheme applicable to the authentication framework provided in HTTP and
was introduced in 1996 as a part of the HTTP/1.0 protocol specification [4,
chap. 11.1]. It was developed further and published as an Internet standard
in RFC 2617 [9] in 1999. Basic authentication is a simple protocol for a
server to authenticate a user requesting access to a protected area, called a
realm. Basic Authentication was never regarded a secure scheme; already
in 1996 ([4]) its authors cautioned users about its weakness: the secret user
credentials are sent in clear text. To be specific, the username and password
are Base64 encoded and sent to the server with no more protection. Base64
is an encoding scheme used for serialization of heterogeneous data items
(text, binary strings, etc.) for transmission over the internet as text [13,
p. 282]. The steps of Basic authentication are outlined below and can be
followed in figure 2.7.
1.1 The user navigates to the protected web site.
1.2 The server responds by challenging the client’s ID.
2 The user enters his username and password.
3.1 The client passes the user’s credentials to the server in Base64
encoded format.
3.2 The server decodes the response and validates the credentials against
its local credentials and access policy. Authenticated and authorized
users are approved access.
12i.e. the password is in a dictionary.
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2.5 Digest Access Authentication
HTTP Digest Access Authentication (short: digest authentication) is a 1997
web standard defined in RFC 2069 [8] and further in the obsoleting RFC
2617 [9] in 1999, for authenticating a client to a server. Its intended use
is on the World Wide Web, but it is perfectly implementable on local
resources, or in any situation where resource access over HTTP should
be restricted13. Digest authentication was introduced as an extension
to the former standard Basic Access Authentication described in [4, chap.
11.1], which is considered insecure [9, 13]. The most critical weakness of
Basic Access Authentication is that passwords are passed in clear (Base64
encoded) over the internet. In practice digest authentication is used to
enforce an access control policy on a certain realm and the resources it
contains. Access to a realm protected by digest authentication requires each
user to:
1. be registered with sufficient credentials (username and password) in
the access control policy of the system enforcing the realm’s access
control (that is, have authorization for access to that realm). An access
control policy is shown in figure 2.9.
2. be able to authenticate himself to the server using those registered
credentials, i.e. provide them to the server upon request.
To understand digest authentication, consider this scenario:
A user wants to access some web resource at http://example.com/
protected/. The /protected/ directory (or realm) is protected with digest
authentication, so that only authorized users can get access to it and its
subdirectories.
Trying to access http://example.com/protected/ initiates the follow-
ing challenge-response communication between the client and server, over
the HTTP protocol:
1. The client’s web browser (user agent) issues a HTTP GET to retrieve
http://example.com/protected/
2. Server responds with a 401 Authorization Required HTTP status
code, indicating to the user that he is currently not authenticated
and that access to this resource is protected, requires access approval
by the system14 and that he is currently not authenticated. Along
with the status code, the server passes a WWW-authenticate header,
containing information needed for the system to calculate the correct
response for the server.
3. The web browser interprets the 401 status code and prompts the user
for the username and password, registered for the specified realm.
13The theoretical part of the scheme is applicable also outside HTTP.
14In the RFC specification, this stage alerts the need of what the 401 header confusingly
refers to as authorization. What the system actually requires is that the user authenticates
himself, so that the system can validate his authorization and either approve or reject access
to the resource.
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4. The entered credentials and the information extracted from the
incoming WWW-authenticate header are hashed. The client issues
another HTTP GET, now with an appended Authorization header,
containing the response value (i.e. the previous hash) and other
values.
5. The server receives the response value – a temporal proof of the
user’s identity and the name of the protection realm to which he
claims to be authorized for access. As hashing algorithms are one-
way functions, there is no way for an adversary to simply extract
the passwords from the value. The protection of the response value
relies on the quality (entropy) of the password, or at the very least
on the preimage resistance of the hash function. At the server side,
a credential hash that was stored locally in the registration phase
and the challenge data are used to calculate another hash value by
the same rules and algorithm as at the client side. If the server side
calculation is equivalent to the one received from the client, the server
can conclude that it is certain of the client’s identity and validate it
against the access policy. If the user is authenticated and authorized,
the server responds with a 200 OK status code and the contents of the
protected resource that the user requested. If not, he is presented with
another 401 Authorization Required and given another attempt at
authenticating.
In addition to cryptographic hash functions, several other security
mechanisms were introduced with Digest Authentication. These are
described in 2.5.1 and 2.5.215.
2.5.1 Replay attacks and the nonce
Basic authentication’s big flaw is that the user credentials are minimally
protected; when handled over an unencrypted medium they are readable
by anyone who knows what to look for. After decoding the password,
the attacker is in a position where he can get approved access by falsely
authenticating himself to the remote server as well as at any other location
the victim happens to be registered with the same password. Introducing
hash functions to basic authentication converts the password in a non-
reversible fashion – by the preimage resistance property of the hash
function, one cannot extract the password from the hash16. The attacker
can no longer directly deduce the password from the source, but he is able
to reuse the values he captures.
Below is a scenario exploiting the first weakness of Basic authentication
– called a replay attack, where credentials are collected by an attacker and
sent to the server, authenticating the attacker as the credentials’ owner.
15Some of digest authentication’s security mechanisms have been omitted for brevity(cf.
section 1.4).
16While the hash function itself cannot be reversed, weak hashed passwords can easily
be recovered through an exhaustive search through the password’s character space. We
discuss this in length in section 2.3.1 and chapter 5.
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Figure 2.8 can be used as reference. From the previous paragraph, we
can see that protecting basic authentication by only substituting Base64
encoding with a one-way function, this form of authentication is also
vulnerable to a replay attack.
1. Alice (the client, or victim) logs on to a remote server and authen-
ticates using her username Alice and the password Alice1234. This
produces the following response value in the Authorization header:
Base64("Alice:Alice1234") = QWxpY2U6QWxpY2UxMjM0Cg==.
The server decodes the header value and verifies the received pass-
word with the stored one. If the passwords are equal, she is authen-
ticated successfully.
2. Harold (the hacker) is tapping into the network traffic, collects Alice’s
encoded Authorization header. He can either decode it and retrieve
the password, trying it at many different locations, or replay the
encoded header to the server directly.
3. Harold has falsely authenticated himself as Alice and gains unauthor-
ized access to Alice’s resources.
This is known as a replay attack. At the level of protection provided
by Basic authentication, the Authorization header is presented to the
server looking like it originated from the other authentic user. The server
unwittingly identifies the login attempt as coming from Alice. Note that
Alice has no way of noticing the attack: she is experiencing a passive
attack from Harold, in which the communication channel is only read
from. Alice’s experience of the authentication process is not changed
– HTTP authentication is a stateless authentication mechanism in which
there is no notion of being logged in17, which means that two consecutive
authentications is not an unlikely event. The false authentication, however,
may originate from another IP address than Alice’s.
Countering replay attacks is done by introducing another value into
the communication: the nonce. The nonce value is a number used only
once. In HTTP Digest Access Authentication, this means for one attempt at
authenticating. After a successful authentication, the same nonce is valid
for a limited amount of time – a nonce lifetime18. The nonce is created at
the server as a challenge to the user. If she is able to respond with that
nonce (and it has not already been used) together with a correctly generated
response value, she passes the challenge. This way, executing a replay
attack must be done before the actual response is sent from Alice. This
is not possible, since the credentials have not yet been entered. The only
way to authenticate without the password is with a MITM attack on both
messages.
17Rather than being logged in to the system, one’s actions are continually controlled by
authentication, appending an Authorization header to every action. Credentials used
for the response calculation are usually stored in the browser for the length of a browser
session.
18Nonce lifetimes are implementation specific, set up during web server configuration.
25
Figure 2.8: A replay attack
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This nonce calculation procedure is suggested in RFC 2617:
nonce = time-stamp H(time-stamp ":" ETag ":" private-key) [9, p. 8]
Where H is some hash function, time-stamp is the current time at the
server, ETag is a fingerprint value19 identifying the contents at the location
and private-key is a value private to the server. Note that this private key
is not used for encryption, but merely as an identification piece; it can be a
random value generated by the server.
The values contained in the suggested nonce calculation are not
thoughtlessly chosen. The time stamp separates each authentication
attempt from every other, in time, and the ETag is used to prevent replay
attacks against updated or dynamic pages. Finally, the private key is used
for the server to ascertain that the integrity of the nonce does not change
during transfer. Albeit being just a suggestion, the nonce calculation
function above (at least the “time-stamp and hash” format) seems to have
become the de facto standard.
Client nonce
The client nonce is a nonce passed from the client to the server to get the
same assurance in the other direction as well. It is used only in conjunction
with the quality of protection (qop) directive. We describe this below.
2.5.2 Quality of Protection
Quality of Protection, defined in the qop field of the Authorization header,
describes what level of protection of the digest authentication scheme is
used. It is sent from the server as an advertisement of available protection
services. The client then selects one and returns this in its qop field. qop is
defined for the following values:
auth
Used to authenticate the user to the server with a username and password.
This is the original digest authentication protection level.
auth-int
As above, with message authentication (additional integrity protection): A
hash of the entity body20 is hashed into the final response value.
— (not set)
Defines degradation to RFC2069, the initial digest specification, to which
RFC 2617 is backwards compatible. qop is not a requirement but a strong
19Fingerprinting is done by lightweight hashing algorithms, whose use is for distinguish-
ing a value from another rather than authentication.
20The textual contents of the document loaded.
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recommendation in Digest authentication. An undefined qop changes the
way the response value is calculated.
This report will focus only on the normal cases of digest authentication,
i.e. qop = auth, thus there will be no examples of additional integrity
protection or RFC2069 compatibility.
(other)
Custom quality of protection values are also allowed in HTTP Digest
Access Authentication. This way, if both server and client implement the
same quality of protection, customized authentication schemes may be
developed using the digest authentication framework.
1 foo:protected :0 ba42b54aadec573fee155ecd67d2dbe
2 bar:protected :6023 ec4af9e9edc3fa072bb540db5dc2
Format: [username]":"[realm]":"MD5([username]":"[realm]":"[password])
Figure 2.9: A sample ACL
2.5.3 Access Control List
The access control policies that are required for digest authentication must
in each entry contain the username and realm, in addition to the password,
or some means of establishing the veracity of the user credentials and
thereby authenticating the user. In the Apache Web Server, which we use
for various examples, the access control policy is a hidden file21 referenced
from a configuration file. In figure 2.9 we present a sample access control
list (ACL) in the format username:realm:MD5(username:realm:password).
The password is not written in clear text, but is hidden inside a hash. This
way, the only way to validate a correct password is to calculate the hash of
the same values.
2.5.4 Calculating the response value
The response value is calculated by the user agent as an answer to the
server’s authentication challenge (a WWW-Authenticate HTTP header). The
response value is the result of hashing two independent parts. The first,
called HA1 is a hash of the realm and the user’s credentials. The second,
HA2, is a hash of the HTTP request method (GET, POST, etc.) and the URI of
the target resource, thus different for every page. One can distinguish HA1
and HA2 as the secret and non-secret values, or as the static and dynamic
components of response, respectively. The static component is the one
stored in the ACL at the server side and is used in calculations to produce
the response value on either side for comparison and validation at the
21Apache defaults to denying access to filenames with the .ht prefix. As a consequence,
configuration files (e.g. .htaccess) and access control lists (e.g. .htdigest) cannot be
fetched through the Apache web server.
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Figure 2.10: The modular architecture of the response value (preimage)
server. It should be considered “secret” because it contains the credentials
of the user, and if compromised it can be replayed to the server. The
dynamic component changes whenever the resource URI or HTTP method
changes, and contains no secret information.
HA1
The contents of HA1 are dependent on the algorithm provided. If MD5 or
no value is defined in the algorithm field, only the user credentials and the
realm are used:
HA1 = MD5(username:realm:password) [9, p. 12]
The realm is appended as a salt to the username and password. If several
of the user’s HA1 values are compromised and all use the same username
and password, each different realm’s HA1 value will be different – there is
no way to directly infer relation between the user’s identities on different
realms. If the server requires HA1 to have time limited validity (algorithm
== "MD5-sess"22 or similar), nonce and cnonce (client nonce)23 values are
also applied:
HA1 = MD5(MD5(username:realm:password):nonce:cnonce)[9, p.
12]
Notice that the time limited HA1 value contains the original HA1 value.
The lifetime of the MD5-sess version of HA1 is dependent on the lifetime
of the nonces, as these are wrapped in. As noted in section 1.4.1, in this
report we will focus only on the normal cases of digest authentication.
We consider MD5-sess outside the scope of the thesis. Seeing that the
HA1 from MD5-sess contains the HA1 from original MD5 authentication,
both methods should be usable with the OffPAD using the same stored
credential values.
HA2
When calculating the HA2 value, the qop field is taken into consideration.
HA2 is defined for qop-values “auth” and “auth-int” and non-present qop
22MD5-sess works per-session
23The client nonce is presented in section 2.5.8.
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for backwards compatibility with RFC 2069. If qop == “auth” or non-
present:
HA2 = MD5(method:uri) [9, p. 13]
Where method is the HTTP request method that was used. It can be any of
the methods described in the HTTP standards, such as GET, POST, etc. All
HTTP Request methods are defined in the HTTP 1.1 RFC [6]. uri is the URI
of the resource that is to be retrieved. If qop == “auth-int”:
HA2 = MD5(method:uri:MD5(entity-body)) [9, p. 13]
response
When both HA1 and HA2 have been calculated, the response value is
finalized depending on whether qop is set: If qop is set (either qop ==
“auth” or qop == “auth-int”)
response = MD5(HA1:nonce:nc:cnonce:qop:HA2) [9, p. 13]
Where nc is an eight hexadecimal digit counter incremented on each HTTP
request. This way, the server could deny any request with an already used
combination of nc and nonce as a replay attempt. If qop is not set, the
response value must be backwards compatible with RFC 2069 using only
the nonce value:
response = MD5(HA1:nonce:HA2) [9, p. 13]
A note on notation
HA1 is the Hashed A1 value. Thus, Ax and HAx describe a value and that
value hashed, respectively.
2.5.5 The state of MD5 and its use in Digest authentication
In Digest Access Authentication, the hash function MD5 [31] is suggested
as the one-way function for creating nonces and calculating the digest of
the user’s credentials.
Since it was published by Ronald Rivest in 1992, MD5 has been subject
to intensive robustness testing. At the 2005 Eurocrypt conference, Xiaoyun
Wang and Hongbo Yu presented an attack that found a MD5 collision
in between 15 to 60 minutes24 [42]. This lead to Rivest (informally)
announcing MD5 as broken [32]. However, this only applies to random
and chosen-prefix collisions25; at the time of writing there are no practical
attacks on preimage or second preimage. The best theoretical approach for
a preimage attack is, at the time of writing, of complexity 2123.4 and was
24In 2009, Xie and Feng presented “an improved algorithm capable of generating a
collision within one minute on a desktop PC” [44].
25Stevens et al. presented an efficient chosen-prefix attack on MD5 in [36] which is usable
to create rogue X.509 certificates, such as those presented in figure 2.6.
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Figure 2.11: HTTP Digest Access Authentication
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presented at the 2009 Eurocrypt conference by Yu Sasaki and Kazumaro
Aoki [33].
The broken state of MD5 does not directly compromise its use in the
communication of Digest authentication. If we assume that the server is
authenticated and secure, there is no way an outside source can influence
the nonce generation, and preimage attacks on MD5 hash are as mentioned
only theoretical; the easiest way to get falsely authenticated is to perform
an exhaustive search or dictionary attack on the HA1 and response values,
yielding the password. We show such an attack in section 5.2. However,
note that RFC 2617 mentions MD5 only as an example, not a requirement.
As long as both the server and client supports digest authentication in the
specified hash suite, any suite is applicable.
2.5.6 Whether or not to use passwords
Storing the HA1 value in the OffPAD rather than in the user’s brain brings
a huge benefit. There is no longer a need for a password. Removing the
notion of a password, however, converts the authentication factor which
was previously “something you know” (the password) into “something
you hold” (the OffPAD device). Passwords can be replaced by random
values that exhaust the maximum entropy of the employed cryptographic
function. This means that using the MD5 hash function, we only need
above 128 random password bits.
We benefit from the choice of such a random password in that there
is no straightforward way to stage a brute force attack against a 128 bit
random value. Human chosen passwords tend to be of low quality and
one may even use side-channel information to stage more effective brute
force attacks[14]. If at the same time the passwords are protected with a
fast hash function, brute force attacks are even more effective.
2.5.7 The state of HTTP Digest Access Authentication
The current Digest authentication scheme is vulnerable to man in the
middle attacks (MITM), where a false remote server may advertise that
they only support earlier, vulnerable editions of HTTP authentication, such
as RFC2069 and even Basic Authentication. We regard our implementation
as secured against attacks of this nature as we have decided not to support
the earlier schemes or backwards compatibility.
This leaves a scenario where a MITM or compromised server advertises
a usable nonce and a valid realm for the user to authenticate to. The victim
produces a response value based on the nonce issued by the false server
that is fully usable. This attack is called a chosen plaintext attack, as the
attacker is able to choose a nonce value. The nonce value is easily availed
by the compromised server upon request, and there is no tie between a
nonce and a user. Thus, with a chosen plaintext MITM attack, the user
can surf the protected web pages and have its traffic monitored. However,
intercepting only the response value from the victim (he never reveals his
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password) the attacker cannot simply impersonate the user and decide on
what protected data to browse on the remote system.
It is required that the attacker is in possession of the static credential
data (HA1) or the user’s password to authenticate as him. The only
possibility an attacker has for recovering one of these from the response
value is a brute force attack, to which HTTP Digest Access Authentication
still is vulnerable. It is very important that none of the communicated data
in the authentication scheme is decipherable or in any way can be used by
an attacker. In section 5.2 we show how this holds if we use either random
passwords or a key derivation function.
RFC2617 states that “The intent [of HTTP Digest Access Authentication]
is simply to create an access authentication method that avoids the
most serious flaws of Basic authentication.” [9]. That may indicate
that it is a “better than Basic but nothing more” solution. We decide
to disregard this, as we see the scheme fit for the future with only
minor modifications. In chapter 5 we scrutinize our scheme and suggest
improvements, countermeasures and best practices.
Based on the above and from what we show in chapter 5, we must
conclude that HTTP Digest Access Authentication is not secure enough as
a contemporary authentication mechanism. Without the use of either long,
random passwords or computationally intensive key derivation functions,
it is not able to keep the privacy of users’ passwords.
2.5.8 The HTTP Digest Authentication protocol in detail
In this section, we will go through all related HTTP status codes, headers
and their fields.
HTTP Headers
WWW-Authenticate – Always present in a 401 Authorization
Required challenge. Its contents are meant to help the user decide
on what credentials to provide and to help the client system (the user
agent) calculate a response value according to protocol.
domain – A list of URIs to which the credentials are applicable.
realm – The name of the protected resource or directory
presented to the user so that he understands what credential
set to use. The realm name is the only value that separates one
protection realm from another. Therefore, no two realms in one
system may have the same name.
nonce – A challenge from the server. The nonce can for example
be a hash of server-specific so that the origin of the challenge can
be verified on the server.
algorithm – The digest algorithm suite used to create the
response value. If not specified, MD5 is used.
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qop – The Quality of Protection describes what protection
services are supported by the service. Choices are auth
(authentication), and auth-int (authentication with integrity
protection), where auth is the default.
stale – The received nonce value does not match the value in
the previous challenge or the nonce has timed out. In both
cases, the stale-flag indicates that the response to the challenge
is wrong and that the user is not authenticated, regardless of
correct credentials and authorization. A fresh nonce is contained
in the header when the stale flag is set.
opaque – A string generated by the server that is to be returned
unchanged when navigating inside the protection realm.
Authorization – The Authorization header is the client’s response to
a server challenge originating from a 401 Authorization Required
status code. Authorization headers are passed with the HTTP request
method and contains the client’s proof of identity.
username – The username of the user.
realm – Same as above.
nonce – Same as above, returned to provide origin authentica-
tion of the challenge.
uri – The URI of the requested resource, to which the response
applies.
algorithm – The one selected algorithm suite of the choice
presented by the server in the challenge.
cnonce – If the qop field is defined in the challenge, the user must
provide a client nonce. The cnonce is similar to the server nonce
in that it identifies the server’s knowledge of the client thus
providing mutual authentication of the communicating entities.
Also, the cnonce acts as a salt to the response value, making it
impossible to build rainbow tables26 for use in an attack scenario
where the attacker controls the nonce.
qop – The selected quality of protection of the choices presented
by the server in the challenge. An algorithm suite may specify
different one-way functions protecting each of HA1, HA2 and
response, or structure the response value another way.
nc – If the qop field is defined in the challenge, the nonce counter
(nc) must also be present. The nc value distinguishes the current
request attempt’s response value from the other response values.
This contributes to the countering of replayed messages.
opaque – The opaque value from the server, returned un-
changed.
26Rainbow tables are pre-calculated tables of a large set of preimages and their
corresponding hash value.
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response – The calculation done by the algorithm defined in
the algorithm field, which proves that the user has knowledge
of his password. A detailed description of the response value
calculation is shown in section 2.5.4.
Authentication-Info is passed to the client attached to the 200 OK
status message indicating that the authentication of the user was
successful and that the user is authorized for accessing the realm.
Following the headers is the contents of the protected web page. The
Authentication-Info header, as the name suggests, provides the client
with additional information about the authentication.
nextnonce – nextnonce is mandatory to use per policy, but is not
used in the current Apache web server. It is intended to establish
the nonce before nonce timeout, so that a stale-flagged message
is not necessary.
rspauth – The response authentication value provides mutual
authentication. By calculating rspauth, the user can ascertain
that the server has knowledge of the user’s secret credentials.
The only difference between response and rspauth is the use of
cnonce instead of the nonce.
cnonce – The cnonce originating from the client.
nc – As in Authorization.
qop – As in Authorization.
HTTP Status Codes
200 OK – Whenever a HTTP request is done successfully, a 200 OK
status code is returned, indicating to the browser that the page
loading was a success. After all the headers, and broken by a blank
line, the contents of the web page follow.
401 Authorization Required – When the web browser is navigated
to a web page protected by a HTTP access authentication scheme, a
401 Authorization Required status code is returned. The 401 status
automatically invokes a credential input screen in the web browser
for authentication.
2.6 Apache HTTP Server
For setting up a sufficient testbed for HTTP access authentication, Apache
HTTP Server (or httpd) is a good option. It supports both the Basic and
Digest authentication schemes. Below we describe two ways of configuring
httpd to protect the contents of a server directory. We assume httpd is
already installed on the server system27.
27Apache HTTP Server is free open-source software, and can be retrieved from http:
//httpd.apache.org/.
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Configuring httpd
Access authentication protection in httpd is done on directories and their
contents and subdirectories. We can create an access policy by either
editing the global Apache configuration file (apache2.conf or httpd.conf)
or by creating a hidden file inside each protected root directory. Figure 2.12
shows a snippet of an httpd configuration file where the directory
protected in /var/vww/ is named realmname is protected with Digest
authentication.
1 <Directory /var/www/protected >
2 AuthType Digest
3 AuthName realmname
4 AuthUserFile /var/www/protected /. htdigest
5 #AuthGroupFile /var/www/protected /. htgroups
6
7 require valid -user
8 #require group authorizedpeople
9 #require user hennikl
10 </Directory >
Figure 2.12: Digest Authentication on Apache Web Server
# – Lines that begin with hash symbols are comments.
<Directory> – Describes what directory is to be protected. The Directory
enclosure is only used in the global configuration file. When setting up
access authentication in a single directory using an .htaccess file, the dir-
ectory is implicit.
AuthType – The type of authentication, either Basic or Digest.
AuthName – The name of the protection realm.
AuthUserFile – The absolute location of the user file (explained below).
AuthGroupFile – The absolute location of the group file (explained below).
require [user|group|valid-user] – Describes what users or user groups
from the digest file are allowed access to the realm. valid-user describes
any authorized user from the user file.
The group and user files
The user file AuthUserFile is the ACL in Apache Web Server’s digest
authentication. When the server receives an authentication reply from the
client, it checks the username against the configuration. The parameter
require decides what users or user groups are authorized. User groups
are written on the form [group] [user 1] ... [user N]. The format of the user
file can be seen in figure 2.9.
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Chapter 3
General discussion
3.1 Evaluation of the OffPAD
In this section we evaluate the OffPAD design and the contained technolo-
gies following the framework specified by Bonneau et al. in The Quest to
Replace Passwords: A Framework for Comparative Evaluation of Web Authentic-
ation Schemes [5]. The 2012 report provides a total of 25 “benefits” separated
into the classes “usability”, “deployability” and “security”. An extensive
list of different online authentication schemes is evaluated1 and compared
with regard to the aforementioned benefit classes. We evaluate our scheme
this way for it to be easily comparable with other similar schemes in the
future.
For the below evaluation, section II, “Benefits” of [5] should be used for
reference. We evaluate the OffPAD based on these benefit classes using the
original names and definitions from the report.
3.1.1 Usability benefits
For a new device2, usability is critical if it is to be adopted on a large scale.
An authentication scheme does not sufficiently benefit its target audience
if it cannot be easily used. Therefore, Bonneau et al. propose the following
usability benefits for authentication schemes:
Memorywise-Effortless
While a future OffPAD may embed biometric access control to the device,
by the current OffPAD design it is required that the user remembers a single
device master password. Therefore it is Quasi-Memorywise-Effortless.
Scalable-for-Users
As it is able to contain a large amount of online identities, the OffPAD is
Scalable-for-Users. The only limit to scalability is the size of its on-board
persistent memory.
1In total 38 schemes are evaluated, where 36 appear in the comparison table [5, Table 1]
2New in the sense that it is not yet widely deployed in the market.
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Nothing-to-Carry
If the OffPAD is implemented as part of a mobile phone (which we pointed
out in section 2.2.4 may be a bad idea) it is Nothing-to-Carry, as the mobile
phone is something that is carried regardless: having an OffPAD inside the
phone will not further encumber the user. However, for now we consider
the OffPAD to be a standalone device, consequentially it is not Nothing-to-
Carry.
Physically-Effortless
There is some physical effort required for handling the OffPAD, closely
tied to the security and the mostly offline requirement of the device. For
it to stay disconnected from the client computer, the device must be
physically moved into the communication range of the client computer for
every authentication. As this interaction is slightly more demanding than
“pushing a button”, as is the example of Physically-Effortless in [5], we
deem the OffPAD not Physically-Effortless.
Easy-to-Learn
Considering the authentication phase, moving the OffPAD within the
communication range of the computer should not be hard for the user
to understand. In the registration phase, the creation and persistence of
credentials may be somewhat difficult. The totality of learning does not
range beyond the notion of Easy-to-Learn. Therefore, the OffPAD is Easy-
to-Learn.
Efficient-to-Use
Both the time it takes to register a credential set on the device and the time
it takes for each authentication to take place is significantly reduced by the
OffPAD compared to the original scheme. It is Efficient-to-Use.
Infrequent-Errors
Relying on the quality of the credentials stored on the OffPAD, it has no
reason to err, thus has Infrequent-Errors.
Easy-Recovery-from-Loss
Should the OffPAD get lost or stolen, its contained credentials follow.
The current idea of an OffPAD does not contain a formal definition
of a backup solution, but one could be easily implementable. Such a
backup could be stored either on the client machine or in some central
location (“http://offpad.com”). The HA1 values must be protected, perhaps
encrypted with a key derived from the device’s master password.
An eventual backup service is future work, so the OffPAD cannot be
classified Easy-Recovery-from-Loss.
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3.1.2 Deployability benefits
The deployability benefits reflect how well the scheme fits in as a newcomer
in the “authentication scheme flora”. They may indicate how likely the
scheme is to be adopted by end-users over the other competing schemes.
Accessible
The OffPAD is accessible to anyone who is capable of performing regular
password authentication. Indeed, the scheme is accessible to anyone who
is able to physically move a device (initiate a connection). We deem the
OffPAD Accessible.
Negligible-Cost-per-User
With any device follows a cost. While service providers may issue their
customers free OffPADs, there are no scenarios where an OffPAD can be
free at all levels, and therefore cannot be considered Negligible-Cost-per-
User.
Server-Compatible
We describe in chapter 5 that the OffPAD has several optional security
mechanisms to future-proof its operation. While the OffPAD’s authentica-
tion mechanism builds on the original HTTP Digest Access Authentication
scheme, we show that the current state of digest authentication is insecure.
Two examples show how the identities can be stored safely on both the
OffPAD and the server.
(a) If using the original scheme where the credentials are stored as un-
iterated MD5 hash values, the plain text password itself must be of
sufficient entropy to evade brute-force attacks. This means that the
password’s entropy must be on or above that of a random 128 bit
value. As MD5 is still preimage resistant, there is no way to recover
a random, MD5-hashed 128 bit value, even if protected only by a
single iteration of MD5. Thus, having the OffPAD or the remote
identity management system generate a 128 bit random value as the
password, the original digest scheme is usable, and the OffPAD is
Server-Compatible
(b) If the remote system for some reason requires passwords that can be
remembered by the user, a password protecting mechanism should
be introduced, such as a key derivation function (see section 2.3.1).
Key derivation functions run one-way functions with an appended
salt, through thousands of iterations, producing a strengthened hash,
on which a brute force attack will take longer per guess (see section
2.3.1)3. Some password policies restrict the length of the password
3However slow, KDFs do not guarantee for the security of the password, only additional
protection.
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and the available character set. Representing the 128 bit value as
16 bytes may be compliant with the length rule. Representing the
values as 32 hexadecimals will be compliant with the character set
rule. Regardless, one can see that these tricks cannot easily be used
together.
Solution (b) is not Server-Compatible, as it requires changes to the
implementation of digest authentication (a custom quality of protection
mechanism4), but is only provided as an addition to the OffPAD concept.
As (a) is usable in most scenarios we regard the scheme as Server-
Compatible.
Browser-Compatible
The OffPAD is not Browser-Compatible as it requires a browser extension
or client software on the machine to mediate message passing between the
OffPAD and the server. Browser compatibility is also broken in order to
break the browser’s authentication context.
Mature
As the concept has not yet been deployed for or tested on a large audience,
the OffPAD and its underlying technologies are not Mature.
Non-Proprietary
The extended digest authentication scheme which runs on the OffPAD is
patented, and therefore the solution is not Non-Proprietary.
3.1.3 Security benefits
A third important factor in an authentication scheme is its ability to protect
the authentication transactions from adversaries, who are either trying to
collect the credentials or replay authentication.
Resilient-to-Physical-Observation
No data that is critical to authentication is ever shown on the OffPAD’s
screen, or on the client computer. The OffPAD is Resilient-To-Physical-
Observation
Resilient-to-Targeted-Impersonation
The OffPAD’s credentials are stored on the device, and must be unlocked
by a master password to become active. Assuming that the master
password cannot be deduced from personal information, the OffPAD is
Resilient-to-Targeted-Impersonation.
4See (other) in 2.5.2
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Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing
As described above, relying on the preimage of the employed one-way
function makes the benefit Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing irrelevant in
this context; there is no reason to throttle a brute force attack of complexity
2123.4 [33]. If this security control is required, implementation is trivial. In
both cases, the OffPAD is unconditionally Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing.
Resilient-to-Unthrottled-Guessing
Again, as previously described, the OffPAD is Resilient-to-Unthrottled-
Guessing and Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing regardless of specific secur-
ity controls. All critical information passed between the OffPAD and the
server consists of a pseudorandom credential that are protected by a one-
way function, or a password protected by a KDF. These protection mech-
anisms make the OffPAD resilient.
Resilient-to-Internal-Observation
If it is possible to gain access to the OffPAD’s memory whenever a HA1
value is present, it can be collected from memory. An HA1 value can be
used (replayed) to authenticate the registered user to the realm specified
in the HA1. In order to retrieve the password, however, the A1 value must
be recovered and the username and realm removed5. The OffPAD is not
Resilient-to-Internal-Observation.
Resilient-to-Leaks-from-Other-Verifiers
This requirement is also dependent on the server’s protection of the
HA1 values. If protected by a KDF or using randomized passwords to
generate HA1, an exhaustive search within response would be infeasible6.
Compromise of the server will still protect the credentials sufficiently to
be Resilient-to-Leaks-from-Other-Verifiers. If today’s digest authentication
scheme is used, however, guessing a password from a snooped response
value is only twice as hard as cracking an MD5 hash (see section 5.2).
Resilient-to-Phishing
Server-side authentication is outside the scope of this thesis. If the OffPAD
is configured with a Petname system for phishing protection, as described
in [41], the OffPAD will protect its user from authenticating to sites that
claim to have a registered user in the OffPAD. Relying on this solution, we
assume the OffPAD also to be Resilient-to-Phishing.
5The password itself is only more valuable than HA1 in situations where the same
password has been used for several of the user’s accounts. If following the best practices
laid out in this report, each password for every service is random.
6Assuming, of course, that the password in the KDF case is of somewhat high entropy.
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Resilient-to-Theft
Being a physical unit, the OffPAD cannot be resilient to theft. However, the
wording in the framework by Bonneau et al. suggests that the resilience
to theft is a measure of the consequence of having one’s device stolen is,
regarding misuse and false authentication with the device. Being protected
by a master password, the OffPAD qualifies as Resilient-to-Theft.
No-Trusted-Third-Party
In a future version including a backup solution, the backup server may be
seen as a trusted third party in the OffPAD communication. The current
OffPAD has No-Trusted-Third-Party.
Requiring-Explicit-Consent
Authenticating with the OffPAD is activated by Requiring-Explicit-
Consent, through the act of physically moving the device within the com-
munication range of the client computer.
Unlinkable
There is no explicit link between a specific OffPAD device and the user-
names registered on it. The device never reveals (through communication)
a device ID or any similar information that is may reveal the identity of the
user. However, of course, usernames and realm names may be transmitted
in clear over HTTP and are not considered sensitive. Colluding verifiers
(identity providers) may conclude that several users are linked if the iden-
tities are registered with the same, or similar usernames on each service.
The definition describes being Unlinkable as not being able to draw this
conclusion from the authenticator alone. This is not possible per se, but be-
cause it likely that an OffPAD owner will register with similar usernames
to different services, we deem the OffPAD Quasi-Unlinkable.
3.2 The OffPAD in contrast to other authentication
mechanisms
Here we present our investigations of how the OffPAD design differs from
a couple of similar contemporary proposals. These were introduced and
described in sections 1.5.1 and 1.5.2. One scheme whose design is very
similar to the OffPAD’s is the Pico. It is envisioned by its inventor Frank
Stajano as a “usable and secure memory prosthesis” [35], and with that
shares a common goal with the OffPAD. Further, in the position paper
Choose the Red Pill and the Blue Pill, Singer and Laurie propose a design
of a “small handheld device, with a graphic user interface, manual input
[...], one or more communications interfaces[...]”. This device is supposed
to work as an additional operating system side by side with the assumed
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Pico OffPAD
Communication
Visual code (camera NFC or other
facilitated) for challenge, physically activated
wireless communication
for response
Protection Asymmetric One-way functioncryptography (hash / KDF)
Physical design
Small device, Small standalone
ideally kept within device or part
another unit of mobile phone
Peripherals Camera, wireless NFC
Number of devices needed Multiple picosiblings One
Requires changes to server Yes No
Requires changes to client Yes Yes
Scope of operation Applicable to Computer systemall systems authentication
Backup solution Yes No
Table 3.1: Comparison between the Pico and the OffPAD
vulnerable client system, which is also a goal of the OffPAD. Because “one
simply cannot properly secure a general-purpose operating system” [23].
3.2.1 The Pico
The Pico design is a yet-to-be-implemented idea of an authentication device
for every person to carry around. In its design, it is suggested that each
person carries a Pico with several Picosiblings (more Pico devices) around.
These will intercommunicate their presence and provide high availability.
Such a pico-network7 provides the Pico owner with personal mobility of his
authentication service. The scheme benefits from this redundancy: should
one Picosibling disappear from the network, there is always another,
keeping the system available. However, the Pico design suffers from poor
usability when consisting of several units. Stajano suggests that this might
be alleviated by embedding the Pico functionality in a mobile phone, or
other units that people already carry, that do not further encumber the user.
He imagines Picos in the shape of “a watch, a key fob, a bracelet or an item
of jewellery.” [35]. The OffPAD has no such demands for high availability.
The proposition demands, however, as we quoted in section 1.5.1, that
there are no application restrictions to the Pico scheme. This means that all
remote access control systems must adjust their authentication framework
in order to be eligible for Pico authentication, a radical demand for an
authentication scheme. The Pico covers the part of the OffPAD design that
deals with identity management and automatic authentication, but has a
more narrow focus on targeted systems.
7Not to be confused with a piconet, which is a network of interconnected Bluetooth
devices.
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3.2.2 Nebuchadnezzar
As we discuss in section 1.5.2, the Nebuchadnezzar design (i.e. the
proposed external device) does not differ greatly from the OffPAD. In
fact, one may see the OffPAD as a physical implementation of the abstract
design. There are, however, some important differences in the motivation
and use of the Nebuchadnezzar. The below are commented excerpts from
the Nebuchadnezzar specification:
1. “We propose using the general-purpose operating system for
everything but the bits that need security” [23]
– Where the Nebuchadnezzar may be used as a general all-
encompassing facilitator of security services, the OffPAD is specific-
ally concerned with user authentication only.
2. “We do admit that it might be possible, with sufficient care, to
somehow share the same device as a mobile phone and as a Neb.”
[23]
– As we argue in section 2.2.5, using a mobile phone as the OffPAD is
incompatible with our assumption of the mobile phone as a general
purpose (hence unsecurable [23]) operating system. We therefore
require the mobile phone, if used as an OffPAD, to be a separate entity
from the phone itself, and run on its own physically disconnected
operating system. This way, both the OffPAD and the phone will
not share devices, but be able to interact with each other. The above
statement does not conflict with the OffPAD design directly, but we
require a stricter definition of how the functionality may be combined
with a mobile phone.
3.3 TazCard as the OffPAD
In section 2.2.4 we described some special requirements for the OffPAD. It
must be mostly disconnected, meaning that all possible contact is restricted,
and that every connection requires consent in its physical activation.
Furthermore it must be able to securely handle identity management.
TazCard from the French company TazTag was a good fit for these
requirements. TazCard is a security focused small device. With a wide
support of connectivity and I/O, it can be customized for a wide range of
applications. The TazCard has native support for Java MIDP8 applications
– so-called MIDlets – that can be deployed to the device via USB over
SCP9. Application developers can utilize TazCard’s connectivity API for
USB, ZigBee and NFC communication.
8Mobile Information Device Profile
9SCP - Secure Copy is a file transfer protocol.
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Connectivity
A very important requirement for the OffPAD is that it is sufficiently
disconnected, or offline. NFC10 is a communications technology that allows
us to keep the OffPAD disconnected most of the time, as it requires the
user to physically initiate a transfer. One must physically move the source
(sender) device into the transmission range of the destination device to
initiate a transfer. The TazCard has additional support for ZigBee and
USB, from which we selected USB for testing purposes. ZigBee is not yet
a widely accepted communication standard for PC communication, and is
also a wider-range technology (10-100 m).
Identity storage
NFC is perfect for transferring identities to the device, by e.g. NDEF11
formatted RFID cards. Support for this is implemented in the identity
management application. It is possible that identities could be created on
the computer and transferred via USB or ZigBee, or input directly on the
device through its user interface.
A probable use case is having the identity provider issue an RFID card
with the user’s identity, and have the user transfer the identity to the
OffPAD himself.
3.4 Authentication with the OffPAD
We can say that the response value in digest authentication is modular,
in that it consists of several “layers” of values before it is finally hashed.
From section 2.5.4 we saw that the response value is calculated using two
already hashed modules, HA1 and HA2, which we call the static and dynamic
components. The HA1 value is static since its result after hashing, called A1
(username:realm:password), never change. HA1 as a credential hash can be
stored securely and used to create response values on every authentication
upon request.
Remembering that the credentials, as used in the challenge-response
communication of digest authentication, produced by a one-way function
allows for confidential interchange of these credentials between endpoints.
The confidentiality is provided in that we have a transient hash value
(the response value) proving that the user is in possession of the correct
credentials, rather than transferring the actual credentials. Since both
endpoints are in possession of the credentials, proving possession is
sufficient, and possible. This is the reason why the password does not have
to be stored in clear text on the server. This proof of possession value (HA1)
is stored both on the OffPAD and server, enabling us to require the HA1
calculation, and the original password, only once – upon registration.
10Near Field Communication
11NDEF is the NFC Data Exchange Format – a formatting standard for RFID cards.
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Figure 3.1: Extended HTTP Digest Access Authentication on the OffPAD
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The client computer is an entrance for an attacker seeking to retrieve the
credentials as they are entered or checked. Demoting the computer to an
intermediary in the authentication communication, we transfer the proof of
credentials between the server and the external secure unit (the OffPAD).
Storing the HA1 value on the OffPAD, the OffPAD handles the response
value generation and credential selection based on the HA1 value alone –
there is no need to introduce the password outside of the registration phase.
This way (again assuming that the server is secure) the user credentials
never appear at a vulnerable location in clear text.
Passing the proof of identity from the OffPAD is done at time of check,
i.e. at the moment credentials are requested by the user agent. Instead
of waiting for manual input from the user, normal authentication flow is
either split or intercepted. The 401 Authorization Required status code
mentioned above and the information it contains are rather passed to the
device than the user.
The control flow of digest authentication using an OffPAD is described
below. Compare this to the normal digest authentication control flow we
showed previously, in 2.5.4. Figure 3.1 can be used as reference.
1.1 The client passes an HTTP GET request to the server at http://
example.com/, requesting the /protected/ directory’s index file.
1.2 A 401 Authorization Required status code is sent back to the client,
together with a WWW-Authenticate header containing information
on the realm and what approach the user-agent should take to
authenticate its user.
2.1 When the WWW-Authenticate header information arrives, the parts
relevant to the authentication process (highlighted in the figure)
are passed to the OffPAD via user-activated NFC. The problem of
extracting header information from the browser context is discussed
in section 3.7.
2.2 The OffPAD has a listening service already running. It notices
the incoming information, and matches it against known identities
(HA1 values) for the requested realm, contained in the OffPAD. If
no identity is found, the user is prompted for credentials and the
resulting identity is stored for later. If multiple identities exist for
the same realm, the user must decide on which one to use.
3.1 The hashed result of the selected local identity and the incoming
header values are received by the computer and passed to the
destination server authenticating the user. The authentication process
will be completely transparent to the server (i.e. it will not differ from
the normal case where a user enters his password).
3.2 The server responds with a 200 OK status code and the contents of the
protected resource the user requested.
The OffPAD as an identity manager requires that the identities are
registered on the device, or can be loaded on request. Similar to a web
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browser password manager such as Opera’s12, the OffPAD can store the
values needed to create a valid hash for each web site, based on the input
described in point 2.2 above.
3.4.1 Authenticating to the OffPAD
For the owner to unlock the OffPAD’s identity management functionality
he must authenticate himself by entering a PIN number or passphrase, or
using another authentication method such as biometry. Authentication
may be validated by comparing a hash of the provided authentication
factor with a locally stored hash of the same value, created in the
registration phase.
3.5 Identity management with the OffPAD
Critical to the overall security of a system is the protection of its access
credentials. If a user’s credential set is stolen, it only affects that user.
Exploits are limited to his privileges13. However, if an identity store is
compromised, the security of the contained identities relies on the quality
of the mechanism protecting them. In the case of original HTTP Digest
Access Authentication, the protection mechanism of the HA1 value is a
single iteration of MD5 on the concatenation of the credentials, which as
discussed in section 2.3.1 is vulnerable to brute force calculation. For an
identity store to be protected sufficiently we at least require the use of an
iterated hash function, such as a key derivation function, or encryption of
each identity. If the stored identities are to be encrypted, the key can be
derived from a password, e.g. using the Password Based Key Derivation
Function 2 (PBKDF2) [40]. Should an attacker be able to retrieve such an
identity storage, he will not be able to recover plain text identities just as
easily.
When user credentials are securely stored, both on the OffPAD and
on the server, what remains is the need of an authentication framework
that protects the credentials in transit. HTTP Digest Access Authentication
transmits its proof of identity (the response value) to the server protected
by the MD5 hash. We assume that the credential value (HA1) is sufficiently
protected, as discussed above. The original digest authentication scheme
is vulnerable in its use of single-iteration MD5, a weakness presented and
discussed in section 5.2.
3.6 Server authentication
When the user navigates to a web site (e.g. https://paypal.no/) to
which he wants to authenticate, he must be certain of the server’s
identity before providing his credentials. A malicious web page (e.g.
12http://help.opera.com/Windows/11.60/en/wand.html
13Of course, if the user has privileges beyond those of the other users (i.e. a super user),
the consequences of a compromise are different.
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https://paypal.nu/) may be used as a proxy, configured to collect the
user’s credentials before successfully authenticating the user to the correct
site and redirecting him there. This is one of many phishing schemes,
luring users into revealing private information. In the thesis work we have
assumed that the server is the correct one, or already authenticated, e.g. by
a correctly defined SSL certificate. The petname system in [41] is a possible
provider of server authentication.
3.7 Collecting the Authentication header
When the user navigates to a protected web page that is supported by the
OffPAD’s authentication service, the user must be notified that he must
move his OffPAD into the communication range of the computer to initiate
authentication. The OffPAD must receive the header information from the
request as quickly as possible, and use it to calculate the response value
that proves the authenticity of the user. The problem of header collection
can be solved in a number of ways, each being either an active or passive
collection method.
Active collection breaks the original control flow of digest authentic-
ation. The headers are removed before they reach the browser, so the
browser does not interpret the request for authentication, and the original
“username and password” login window never appears at the computer.
Passive collection extracts the header without interfering with original
control flow. Consequently, the user will still get the ability to authenticate
manually from the browser, even if authentication has already taken place
outside of the browser context. This approach may confuse the user,
because the login window appears regardless of the success of the external
authentication. Some possible collection methods are shown in table 3.2.
For the best usability, we require that the user is not presented with
the login window unless the automatic authentication implementation fails
– this to avoid confusion. We also require that as much as possible of
user interaction with the computer is removed. We conclude from our
suggestions, that the browser extension solution is the most reasonable
one in that it is able to gracefully break the control flow and, relative to
the alternatives, is very simple to set up. The browser extension software
additionally benefits the user in that it does not require any particular
learning by the user, and is rather unobtrusive. The extension is presented
in section 4.2.
3.8 Software
The software discussed within this thesis includes the following three:
(a) HTTP Digest Handler MIDLet – A Java J2ME implementation of
identity management and automatic HTTP Digest Authentication on
a TazCard.
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Method Active/Passive Advantages Disadvantages
Firewall rule or
socket-level re-
direction
A Can filter out
digest headers
and route them
directly to the
OffPAD
Very difficult to
implement – too
advanced.
Browser exten-
sion
A Can prevent the
browser from
loading the
login window
and let the
OffPAD take
over the
authentication
context
Somewhat
difficult to
implement
Packet capture P Can probe the
client
computer’s
network
interface card
(NIC) for
incoming HTTP
requests, easily
filter digest
headers and
route them to
the OffPAD
Does not
interfere with
the browser’s
login window
causing
confusion.
Additionally, a
large storage
and processing
overhead.
Table 3.2: Different approaches to collecting header information
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(b) HTTP Digest Handler Application for Android – An Android
application port of the above J2ME application.
(c) HTTP Authentication Extension for Google Chrome – A JavaScript-
written extension for Google Chrome which passes authentication
requests to the OffPAD application handling authentication.
Software implementations (a) and (c) have been successfully tested to-
gether, and provide the user with a functional automatic authentication
service. Software (b) was not finished, lacking a proper test device (the
TazTag TPH-ONE). All these are presented in chapter 4.
3.9 Use case scenarios
In this section we suggest a couple of use cases in which the use of the
method is shown.
3.9.1 Registration phase
The registration phase for the extended digest authentication scheme is not
significantly different from the original scheme. We assume that identities
are stored in an access control list (ACL) at the server in the same way that
they are stored on the OffPAD, as this facilitates synchronous calculation of
the response value.
Premises:
• The user wants to register to a specific online service that requires
HTTP Digest Access Authentication.
• The user is carrying an OffPAD with the HTTP Digest Handler
application set up. The mechanism is configured in compliance with
HTTP Digest Access Authentication.
Case:
1. The user is requested that his OffPAD is connected.
2. The user authenticates to the OffPAD, which unlocks upon correctly
entered credentials.
3. The user transmits a unique identifier of the user, e.g. a username,
the device’s ID, etc.
4. The server registers the user identity and authorizes the user access
to the service, by appending the identity to the access policy.
5. A password is chosen for the user’s account. Since there is no
longer a requirement that the user remembers his password, it should
ideally be a long random number. From section 2.5.6, we draw the
conclusion that a 128 bit random value is sufficient for our purposes.
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Both the user and the server may generate this password, as long
as it is delivered to the other party in confidence, so that it is not
revealed, and the authentication process’ calculations can be done
synchronously. The HA1 value is computed as
HA1 = H(username : realm : password)
where H is an agreed-upon digest function, such as SHA-256 or MD5.
6. HA1 must be transferred to the other party in one of the following
ways:
(a) Securely online, e.g. by using asymmetric encryption or similar.
(b) Transferred by mail (out of band) to the user, delivered by cour-
ier (signed, personal receipt), etc. This is necessary for high as-
surance level services, such as those provided by governments,
etc.
In the (b)-case we suggest using an RFID card as transportation
medium. The OffPAD could support contactless communication
such as NFC, enabling the reading of encrypted HA1 values for local
storage.
3.9.2 Online bank authentication with the OffPAD
Premises:
• An authentication server connected to the bank.
• A customer (user) carrying an OffPAD wants to authenticate to the
bank.
• The user is authorized access to the bank.
Case:
1. The user navigates his web browser to a protected web service.
2. The user is requested that his OffPAD is connected.
3. The server replies with an authentication request, whose contents are
routed to the OffPAD.
4. The OffPAD, using the HA1 value and the incoming request paramet-
ers generates a response value, which is passed to the server in a re-
sponse header.
5. The authentication server validates the identity of the user against the
HA1 value stored in its access control policy.
6. If the authenticated client is authorized for access (i.e. his HA1 value
is noted in the access policy), he is approved access to the service.
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Figure 3.2: A flowchart describing the phases of operation
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Chapter 4
Technical description
In this chapter we present the structure and flow of the software in detail,
and how the theory from the earlier chapters is implemented as an OffPAD
application.
There are two separate applications needed for the client computer
and the OffPAD to pass authentication information. In the following
we refer to these as the client- and authenticator software, respectively.
The client software is called the HTTP Authentication Extension for Google
Chrome, a browser extension handling incoming authentication requests,
passing them to the OffPAD rather than the user. The authenticator
software, HTTP Digest Handler, has been developed for different OffPAD
platforms: a TazCard and a TazPhone (TPH-ONE) application. The
latter has not been fully developed, as we lacked a proper testing device
during implementation. The TazCard application is a J2ME based mobile
application and the phone runs on the Android platform. Both applications
communicate with a secure element embedded in the device. The
authenticator software for the TazCard is presented immediately below,
followed by a short comment on the TazPhone in section 4.1.4. The browser
extension (client software) is described in section 4.2.
4.1 HTTP Digest Handler MIDlet
The main responsibilities of the OffPAD are identity management and to
facilitate authentication using the managed identities. Its main task is
to receive WWW-Authenticate header fields and in return create response
header values based on the stored identities and the received data.
Identities are stored on the TazCard’s internal persistent memory. Using the
javax.microedition.contactless library1 to harness the TazCard’s built-
in NFC capabilities, it is possible to transfer identities to the TazCard from
RFID cards. Identities are written to these RFID cards in the NDEF format.
This is discussed in section 4.1.3. Any identity used is stored locally, if
possible. For message passing to and from the computer, it is connected
with USB. In a final version, the USB connection should be a secondary
1The J2ME Application Programming Interface for contactless communication.
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(fail safe) option chosen over wireless communication (NFC). As argued
in section 3.3. We suggest that only contactless communication is used, as
it is the technology best suited for keeping the OffPAD “mostly offline”.
Contactless technologies require physical interaction, therefore conscious
consent from the user, to function.
In order to recreate the TazCard execution examples and the use cases
described in this report, a number of prerequisites apply:
1. A client computer system with the following:
(a) A web browser with support for HTTP Digest Access Authen-
tication. This is supported by every popular web browser.
(b) A local network or Internet connection2.
(c) A USB port for communication with the OffPAD.
2. A server acting as authentication server. The server can be remote to
the client machine, on the same network or run on the client machine
itself3. It must have:
(a) Support for HTTP Digest Access Authentication4.
(b) An access control policy5.
In the following, the client side is understood as either 1. or the human user;
based on context. Server side is as described in 2.
4.1.1 Architecture
Figure 4.1: Architecture of the HTTP Digest Handler
2This is not required if the server is run locally on the client computer.
3Configuration of HTTP Digest Access Authentication on the Apache HTTP Server is
described in 2.6.
4Supported by all popular servers, as it is part of the HTTP authentication framework.
5This is usually a list of authorized users and a digest of the username, password and
protection realm.
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The TazCard application is built up by modules, each with their own
area of responsibility. Figure 4.1 shows the assembly of those modules,
and can also be used as a guideline for the development of other OffPAD
authentication applications. Suggestions / future possibilities are shown in
grey.
Identity Management
The Identity Management module is the management system for remote
identities, i.e. the online identities or credential set that the owner of the
device assumes when using the device for authentication. This module
handles the creation and modification of identities and works together with
the Identity Storage module.
User Management
The User Management module manages all the OffPAD’s local identities.
This means that one authentication service may have several users on the
same OffPAD. This is relevant for families or groups of people sharing
one OffPAD. As an example, consider a workplace situation where several
users interact with the same computer system. To authenticate, each
employee can unlock their personal “OffPAD profile” on the shared device
(with their personal master password) and authenticate throughout their
session with the shared computer, until another user unlocks her profile.
This way, each employee is relieved of bringing her own OffPAD to work.
Identity Storage
Identity Storage comprises all storing of remote identities. The application
supports storing identities either locally on the device, or on external RFID
identity cards. In some situations, one might benefit from decoupling the
identity and authenticator, perhaps when authenticating from a shared,
but trusted OffPAD, e.g. at a library6, or again a workplace. If an
authentication request appears on the OffPAD for a realm to which there
are no available identities, it requests the user to register or provide
temporary authentication. This can be done on the spot by moving an
identity card (RFID) near the device, for it to read.
Utilities
In the Utilities category, there are several generic tools that are reusable
on different systems. The currently implemented utilities comprise I/O,
layout, encoding and byte/string operations. The application is developed
with modularity in mind, so that one specific function, (e.g. the home
screen) may easily be exchanged with another.
6We do not address how to do this securely or argue on whether such a shared OffPAD
is a good idea. After all, it would no longer be a personal authentication device.
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Authentication service
The authentication service module is a large module, in itself containing
other modules. Exchanging digest authentication for another authentica-
tion scheme should be fairly simple. One could also change the protec-
tion mechanism for stored and transferred credentials (one-way function),
which we suggest in chapter 5 may be an option.
Graphical User Interface
The GUI for the TazCard application is developed using Sun’s Lightweight
User Interface Toolkit com.sun.lwuit. We have manually included
navigation between screens by finger (swipe gestures) through the J2ME
touch screen function pointerDragged.
Communication
While the TazCard supports several communication technologies, the
only developed module is USB communication. This connection handles
all communication to the client computer. It may be exchanged with
another communication technology implementation. In the case of USB
communication, the TazCard appears to the computer as a Network
Interface Card (NIC) accessible through the static IP address 192.168.42.1.
Unencrypted communication is only allowed through UDP port 4242, but
encrypted protocols SSH (secure shell) and SCP (secure copy) are also
supported. SCP can be used to copy files between the TazCard’s file system
and the computer.
Logging
Support for logging is also present in the OffPAD. The ability to audit the
actions and interactions on the device is leveraged by a sufficient logging
procedure. The TazCard is also able to log to standard output (stdout) at
runtime, using common Java commands.
4.1.2 Running the Midlet
Here we describe both the registration phase and the authentication phase
as use cases, with references to functions in the software.
Registering a new online identity
Before authenticating users to online services, the TazCard reads each
identity object7 into memory from a series of credential files in the /users/
directory on the TazCard. To register a new credential set on the TazCard
one must enter or create a file in the /users/ directory and append a
line containing the credentials. These credential files are formatted like
7no.uio.ifi.tazdigest.identity.Identity
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Apache’s access control lists (see figure 2.9). The application must be
restarted to be able to recognize and load the new identity object.
Authenticating with a stored online identity
With the browser plugin installed in Google Chrome, every supported ad-
dress that produces a HTTP Digest Access Authentication challenge will
automatically be transferred to the TazCard via USB. When an authentic-
ation request appears on the TazCard, the thread ChallengeWatchThread
will receive it and let NetworkCommControl.parseAndRespondToChallenge()
look for a realm supporting the challenge. If an identity is found (i.e. the
TazCard has a stored HA1 for that combination of realm and username), HA1
is loaded into the function NetworkCommControl.calculateAndPassBack().
Here a response value is calculated using an embedded, freely available
MD5 library written by Paavolainen and Macinta [24].
Authenticating with an RFID identity card
If the authentication challenge appears at the TazCard and no correspond-
ing stored identity is found, the device alerts the user and requests him
to present an RFID card with the identity object stored on it. When one
subsequently appears within the reading range of the device, the same
calculation as above is executed, now based on the identity stored on
the card. The MIDlet has an always-invoked listener for NFC events,
CommunicationListener. By the interface TargetListener it executes the
method targetDetected() whenever an RFID card is discovered. When
an unknown identity is used on the OffPAD, the user is queried to store it
on the device for later use.
4.1.3 Storing identities on NDEF cards
The initial intention with the NDEF RFID cards was to store entire identity
triples, ideally encrypted with the device’s unique public key and signed
by the issuing party. It turned out that the bundled cards’ storage is
limited to 42 bytes. Therefore, for the convenience of longer usernames
and realm names8, we decided to compress the identity triples using a very
computationally light algorithm based on Huffman encoding.
We assume that the average identity triple consists of eight characters
for each the username and realm, two colons and 32 characters for the 16
octets of the MD5 hash9. These sum up to 50. As we represent the HA1 value
in hexadecimal format, we decide priority for the hexadecimal numbers in
the encoding scheme – they are used in at least 3250 = 64 % of the triple.
The rest are the ordinary ASCII letters ( 6450 = 32 %), not to forget the colon
(:), always appearing at two spots ( 250 = 4 %). We use this probability of
occurrence as a basis for the total character weight. The non-hexadecimal
8As the HA1 value is fixed-size, only these two values interfere with the total size.
9We decided to represent the HA1 value in hexadecimal following Apache’s formatting
of ACL files.
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Character Adjustment Weight Encoded bits Char. Adj. (%) Weight Bits
: 0 0,04 0101 t 8,21 0,017 111000
0 0 0,04 0110 o 6,01 0,017 111001
1 0 0,04 0111 i 5,21 0,017 111010
2 0 0,04 00100 n 4,91 0,017 111011
3 0 0,04 00101 s 4,21 0,017 111100
4 0 0,04 00110 h 3,91 0,017 111101
5 0 0,04 00111 r 3,81 0,017 111110
6 0 0,04 10000 l 0,9 0,016 111111
7 0 0,04 10001 u -1 0,016 110000
8 0 0,04 10010 m -1,5 0,016 110001
9 0 0,04 10011 w -1,5 0,016 110010
a 0 0,04 10100 g -2,1 0,016 110011
b 0 0,04 10101 y -2,1 0,016 110100
c 0 0,04 10110 p -2,2 0,016 110101
d 0 0,04 10111 v -3,5 0,015 110110
e 0 0,04 01000 k -3,9 0,015 110111
f 0 0,04 01001 j -4,8 0,015 00000
x -4,8 0,015 00001
q -4,9 0,015 00010
z -4,9 0,015 00011
Table 4.1: The static Huffman encoding scheme
characters (g-z) are additionally weighed relative to each other. We weigh
these by each letter’s frequency in the English language documented by the
Oxford Dictionary [43]. Each of these 20 remaining letters’ probability of
appearing as one of the 26 English characters is listed as the row “Weight”
in table 4.1.
As a result from the weighting get the substitution table marked
“Encoded bits”. We then use this for compression and decompression
for every piece of information to transmit via spare storage media such
as NDEF. We decided to use a static substitution table to avoid additional
analysis workload on the handheld device.
4.1.4 HTTP Digest Handler for TazPhone
The TazPhone (TPH-ONE) is TazTag’s Android mobile phone, and is the
first secure mobile phone with NFC and ZigBee communication [39]. Its
secure element facilitates secure storage and handling of critical data, such
as the HA1 hash values. The application is written in Java using the Android
library, built by Eclipse and the Android Development Tools (ADT) Plugin.
As mentioned, lacking a proper TazPhone testing device, there is no
support for communicating with the secure element in this application.
The secure element functionality is therefore only shown in the MIDlet
(section 4.1). As a result of the minimal development, the TazPhone
application is sparsely described in this report because of its similarity to
the TazCard application. The functionality of the TazPhone application
would most likely be equal to that of the TazCard. From the architecture
presented in figure 4.1, the GUI and communication technology modules
must be rewritten to support the Android user interface and NFC
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communication.
4.2 HTTP Authentication Extension for Google Chrome
Challenge-response authentication using an external device introduces the
issue of how the challenge should be transferred to the device. In section 3.7
we argue that the most reasonable and usable solution is having a web
browser extension collect the challenge. A browser extension is a great way
of providing enhancements to the browsing experience. It is placed at an
abstraction layer well suited for slightly altering the user’s interaction with
the web browser. The extension must be simple in use and installation,
and require little or no knowledge and effort from the user; all the inner
workings of the extension should be abstracted from the user.
The TazCard browser extension is written in JavaScript as a browser
background script (explained below in section 4.2.1). It uses the Google
Chrome webRequest API for catching authentication headers related to
HTTP Digest Access Authentication challenges. This happens in the event
chrome.webRequest.onHeadersReceived. In the browser window, an icon
is visible, indicating the current running state of the extension, and is also
used to toggle the state: a light green icon indicates that the extension is
enabled and accepts incoming authentication challenges, and a light red
icon indicates that the service is disabled.
Whenever the extension notices that the browser has navigated to a
supported site, it takes action in the headersReceivedListener() event
listener. The WWW-Authenticate response header is stripped from the
response, and its values extracted. Immediately, the postToTazCard()
function passes an AJAX10 HTTP POST to the TazCard with an appended
request header called OffPAD-Authenticate. Within are the fields from the
WWW-Authenticate header, realm, nonce, algorithm, qop. The address of
the resource, uri, is also appended, after method. HTTP GET is the only
supported HTTP method. The OffPAD-Authenticate header is quickly
received by the OffPAD and handled in its running listener application,
desribed above.
4.2.1 Background script
While browsing the Internet, a series of events occur in the web browser,
and in the case where a background script is enabled, JavaScript code
linked to these events may be executed. Table 4.2 shows a selection
of browser events related to header transmission and their JavaScript
counterpart available in Google Chrome. The list is adapted from Google
Chrome’s extension documentation [11]. In figure 4.2 we show an example
of how a background script can be used to show an alert whenever a
response is about to be sent (the onResponseStarted event fires).
10 Asynchronous JavaScript and XML (AJAX) is a collection of technologies providing
asynchronous web requests outside the normal browser context.
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Event JavaScript event Description
Authentication Required onAuthRequired Normally shows the
username and password
dialogue. Used to modify
this behaviour.
Request initiated onBeforeRequest Before TCP connection is set
up. Used to modify or stop
connection.
onBeforeSendHeaders Before headers are sent from
client. Used to add, remove
or modify existing headers.
Response received onResponseStarted Informs when the server
response appears at client,
before it is processed.
onHeadersReceived Before headers are received
at the client. Used to modify
incoming headers.
Table 4.2: Different browsing events in Google Chrome
1 chrome.webRequest.onResponseStarted.addListener(
2 function(details) {
3 alert(’foo ’);
4 }, {urls: ["<all_urls >"]},
5 [" responseHeaders "]
6 );
Figure 4.2: A background script linked to a browser event
In this script, whenever a response is to be created, the message foo is shown.
4.3 Technical execution flow
In the following we present each step of the user authentication process in
detail. Each numbered point from figure 4.3 is explained, in a scenario
where a user navigates to a protected remote realm to which he must
authenticate for access.
1. The HTTP Authentication Extension for Google Chrome has
been enabled in the client web browser to act on in-
coming headers. The initialization function init() in
the background script (background.js) adjusts the browser
to call the function headersReceivedListener() upon every
chrome.webRequest.onHeadersReceived event. The client web
browser navigates to http://heim.ifi.uio.no/hennikl/protected/
to retrieve the root document.
2. The server responds with a 401 Authorization Required HTTP
status code containing a challenge to the client.
3. (a) Before the challenge has been interpreted by the web
browser, it is caught by the headersReceivedListener()
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Figure 4.3: Technical execution flow (server perspective)
listener function, which validates http://heim.ifi.uio.no/
as a supported URL (using the function isSupported()).
(b) The listener iterates the response headers (details.
responseHeaders) and locates the WWW-Authenticate header.
(c) The function extractValues(), extracts the challenge data:
realm, nonce, algorithm, qop, method and uri, and returns a
string with these concatenated.
(d) Next, the postToTazCard() function builds an HTTP request
to the TazCard. Here, the challenge information is converted
into hexadecimal, and entered into a request header called
OffPAD-Authenticate for the OffPAD to interpret.
(e) The TazCard is assumed to be connected to the computer
at IP http://192.168.42.1:4243. The request built in
postToTazCard() is sent as an HTTP POST request, and the
execution of the background script temporarily ends.
4. (a) At the TazCard, the thread ChallengeWatchThread is run-
ning, and is activated when the HTTP POST request
arrives from the computer. In it, the simple func-
tion NetworkCommControl.cleanFromComputer() is invoked,
to strip the incoming request of the OffPAD-Authenticate
header. The header is converted into ASCII and the challenge
values are returned as a byte array.
(b) The challenge is passed to the function NetworkCommControl.
parseAndRespondToChallenge(), where it is converted to
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an AuthenticateChallenge object. When the TazCard
application was started, all possible identities were loaded
into the application’s memory, located in IdentityManager.-
identities. These are retrieved by the function Identity-
Manager.realmHasALoggedInIdentity().
(c) If there are several identities supported for the requested
realm, an identity selection screen is invoked, from which
the user must select what identity to assume. If there is one,
this identity is used. If no identities are available, the user is
asked to present an RFID card with a valid identity. If unable
to do so, execution ends.
(d) When the correct identity is selected, NetworkCommControl.
calculateAndPassBack() is called, with the challenge
and the selected identity as parameters. The class
ResponseCalculator, which takes care of HTTP Digest Ac-
cess Authentication, calculates the response value from the
parameters, and returns the resulting bytes.
(e) A set of response parameters is built, consisting of values from
both the identity, challenge and the calculated response. A
static cnonce is used in the implementation. The parameters
are returned as an InfoPiece object to ChallengeWatchThread.
In total, it comprises: username, realm, nonce, uri, algorithm,
response, qop and cnonce.
(f) A HTTP 200 OK is written, as a response to the POST issued
from the browser. Appended to it is the aforementioned
parameters, in an OffPAD-Info header.
(g) The ChallengeWatchThread returns and starts listening for
more challenges.
5. (a) When the TazCard has responded to the challenge the browser
background script can return and work on the received
response.
(b) The function authenticateTo() takes the header collected
from the TazCard and uses it to build an Authorization
header to use against the remote server. The parameters
received are split and placed into their respective location
in the Authorization header. The resulting header is equal
to what would have been generated by the browser in the
original case, with the user entering his credentials manually.
The Authorization header is sent to the remote server from
the browser extension, whose execution terminates until the
next challenge appears.
6. The server receives the Authorization header from the client’s
browser. As there is no difference between the original digest
scheme and the way the TazCard produces its response, the
server’s calculation of the response value is equal. If the user
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credentials (the HA1 value and the user name) on the TazCard are
correct, and the user is authorized access to the realm, the server
approves access.
7. The client receives a HTTP 200 OK status from the server, along
with the contents of the protected resource.
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Chapter 5
Security testing
Below we present different experiments on trying to interfere with, or
compromise the authentication process we have described above. We
comment on the feasibility on each of the approaches and how, based
on the results, the process should be strengthened.
As in all the implementation examples, we also here assume Apache
httpd is running as the server side application. This means that
all experiments have been done using httpd and that other server
applications may react differently.
The experiments show different attack vectors in the entire system
described in this report. When attempting to abuse the system, there
are many different angles to choose from. The motivation for attacking
an authentication system may be to harvest user credentials, gain
unauthorized access to the systems to which the user authenticates, or
both. Also, the system may be exploited to carry out unauthorized
authentication. If the device, the application or the communication
process is not protected sufficiently, the user may fall victim to identity
theft.
5.1 A comment on compliance with the TOCTOU
principle
By looking into Authorization headers passed to the server on several
HTTP GET requests over time, we can confirm that httpd’s standard for
nonce lifetime is set to 300 seconds[7]. When the nonce lifetime has
run out, the client is initially unaware. It will try using the old nonce
but is notified by the server after the first failed attempt. When an old
nonce appears at a server, it responds with a new 401 Authorization
Required, a fresh nonce value and the stale-flag set to true, indicating
to the client that the nonce was aged and has been replaced. This
method is specified in the RFC[9]. If the user agent has the credentials
remembered, the transition to a fresh nonce will be done automatically
and a valid response value is calculated, re-authenticating the user.
However, the TOCTOU principle (which we introduced in section 2.1.2)
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does not hold, as this passive re-authentication is not another time of
check. It does not update the system’s assurance that the identity is
correct. For the ∆TOCTOU (i.e. the time between check and use of
the credentials) to be as short as possible, the user should be forced
to physically re-enter his credentials to reassure the system. With an
OffPAD, this is equivalent to a physical re-authenticating by initiating
communication between the device and the computer.
5.2 Attacking the challenge-response protocol
From figure 2.10 we can see that the realm- and username is used as a
salt to the hash function producing HA1. As the password is not hashed
alone, one cannot retrieve the password through a (pre-calculated)
rainbow table. A rainbow table for the purpose of attacking a password
within a HA1 value must be pre-calculated for one particular combination
from the set of realms and usernames. In the HA1 calculation (section
2.5.4), the static values (username, realm and colons) are analogous to
salt. In the response calculation (section 2.5.4) we consider the HA1 value
analogue to password and the static values (nonce, nc, cnonce, qop and
HA2, all separated by colons) analogue to salt.
We have the following:
1. One or more HTTP GET requests to a resource containing an
Authorization header are snooped, i.e. read off the network cable
or wireless channel by a Man In The Middle.
2. A possibly high number of different response values. These are
hashes of the same combination of header data and a different,
known salt (nc) each time.
An Authorization header’s response value is an expression on the
form:
HA1 = MD5(s1||password)
response = MD5(HA1||s2)
Where || describes string concatenation, s1 and s2 are the static
values, of the format "username:realm:" and "nonce:nc:cnonce:qop:HA2"
respectively.
A successful brute force attack on the password will reveal the static
secret HA1 value that in turn can be validated by the response calculation
above.
As stated in section 2.5.5, attempting to break the one-way property
of MD5 is not practical at the time of writing. The most effective known
preimage attack has a computational complexity of 2123.4[33]. To find a
usable password1, however, we must find the preimage of the response
value, which itself is hashed.
1 Although this is a fully usable password within the system, it is only so because
the calculations yield the same response value. There is no certainty as to whether the
password retrieved is the password the user originally selected, so it is not guaranteed that
a successful brute force attack yields a password that is transferable to other systems.
68
Figure 5.1: An attack on digest authentication
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password HA1 response
hennikl:realm:a 7a29f74992 . . . a0fdda 8f2a65080a8761d4ee6da59544ccc186
hennikl:realm:b e3e5f66d00 . . . de36f6 61f33b9a185989d9f215c916e67afa68
hennikl:realm:c 53d83d97af . . . 05404e 10bb7eca0fcf8876b3cf8a44fa98a185
hennikl:realm:d 9ef81d5334 . . . 769b8a beaa89ecc4c7f7863982ff1f65efd65e
hennikl:realm:e a0b1fae479 . . . 397e1d d17b3e2a0ddc857329c3aa4df232736d
hennikl:realm:f 5a991fb4a4 . . . d5fc0c 49f275d192e250e8a5787284298f8e05
hennikl:realm:g 4f71d53117 . . . 84d22d 3cc9c20d9a0006cb8cc371b3c873aec4
hennikl:realm:h dabeeba885 . . . 78a195 d3c91f4d2fe3ca8ba28f9bb3cbefd4b9
hennikl:realm:i 115dd27a08 . . . b633ca 1183e7df1779e43473e26e0febd6148d
. . .
hennikl:realm:passwor5 9684b080fa . . . 9901f4 b815adac2c1045b40ed621c347b661a8
hennikl:realm:passwor6 3caa6da3aa . . . 69b735 31380b94e595f449ccafc2bf9063ff2b
hennikl:realm:passwor7 14fe235f79 . . . abb63c 35127fbc6b025ccc8540b690d7958013
hennikl:realm:passwor8 b1a7fe3369 . . . f0966c 26794bc1025236342aee2c653d52a7c9
hennikl:realm:passwor9 7f8f6ef704 . . . 7c0ff3 c7b18e356f24ed141dbd9e0cf3722a89
hennikl:realm:passwora d356381226 . . . 9cd4e3 28aabbb0f847fdabc899ae0f949caae7
hennikl:realm:passworb 5b4415f182 . . . 7b8b95 9a816243210af42e50767f61ba0fea7c
hennikl:realm:passworc e281050e8f . . . 50f93a d62ef054edaa5b216db454e565e36a0a
hennikl:realm:password f19b0a03ee . . . 471dcf f15370722fb0a84b799c669cdb4b35d6
Table 5.1: An example of an exhaustive search
However, attacking from another angle is possible. At the same
time as we collected the Authorization header, we also collected all
the values needed to calculate the HA1 except the password. Actually,
all values making up the entire final response are accessible should
we find the correct password. Exhaustively searching the available
preimages’ character space is a usual approach to password cracking on
hashed passwords. In this scenario we must customize the password
cracking algorithm to first hash the guessed password together with the
rest of the A1 parameters to recreate a suggestion for HA1. Second, we
must use that HA1 value in the response calculation (using the retrieved
nonces and other collected parameters) to produce a possible response
value. Finally, in the targeted event that the response value equals the
one collected, we have guessed a password that is usable at least in any
session with the same system. We have decoupled the password from
the nonce- and client nonces. In table 5.1 and figure 5.1, we show how
this approach is possible, using these example values:
username: hennikl
realm: realm
nonce: aGVsbG8=feffda0520707fc331d9be9eff74eab1eb7cafe4
cnonce: SHZlbSBoYWRkZSB0cm9kZCBhdCBkZXQgc3RvZCBub2UgaGVyPw==
nc: 00000001
uri: /foo/
method: GET
qop: auth
correct password: password
correct HA1: f19b0a03eead15d687986227dc471dcf
MD5("hennikl:realm:password");
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correct HA2: 2e18ba280b7f2a4e2785f9d88fc7aa72
MD5("GET:/foo/");
correct response: f15370722fb0a84b799c669cdb4b35d6
MD5(HA1:nonce:nc:cnonce:qop:HA2);
Each of the text values are to be interpreted as strings of bytes.
The presented hashes are strings of bytes in hexadecimal (but ASCII)
representation. The only value changing between each HTTP GET within
one such nonce lifetime (five minutes) is the nonce counter, nc, which is
incremented on every client request. Thus is the only value responsible
for the change of the response value between requests to the same
resource. If multiple Authorization headers are collected, each have
different nc values, but may be attacked in parallel processes, each
having equal probability of recovering the password.
5.2.1 Pseudocode
This section contains pseudocode showing the execution of the
exhaustive attack on the digest authentication scheme. It follows the
same general recipe as any brute force hash cracking algorithms, namely
going through an entire dictionary until the attack succeeds. Algorithm 1
shows the calculation of the response value. Algorithm 2 iterates
through a stack of suspected passwords in a dictionary, passing each
password suggestion to the response calculator. It requires the data from
one intercepted Authorization header. The dictionary can of course
contain anything from arbitrary bytes to English dictionary words.
The procedures DigestCalcHA1, DigestCalcHA2 and DigestCalc
Response are equal to those specified in RFC2617[9]. The one-way
function, however, which is MD5 in the specification, may be regarded
as any other one-way function as long as it is used equally on both
endpoints of the authentication. Synchronization of the selected one-
way function is done using the algorithm field.
Procedure: CalculateResponse
Data: pszMethod, pszDigestUri, pszQop,
pszUsername, pszRealm, pszPassword,
pszNonce,pszCNonce, pszNonceCount
Result: pszResponse
ha1← DigestCalcHA1(pszUsername, pszRealm, pszPassword)
ha2← DigestCalcHA2(pszMethod, pszDigestUri, pszQop)
response← DigestCalcResponse(ha1, ha2, pszMethod, pszDigestUri,
pszQop, pszNonce, pszNonceCount, pszCNonce)
return response
Algorithm 1: This procedure calculates the response value
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Procedure: DigestDictionaryAttack
Data: pszMethod, pszDigestUri, pszQop,
pszUsername, pszRealm, pszNonce,
pszCNonce, pszNonceCount, pszTargetResponse
Result: pszPassword or null
while dictionary is not empty do
pszPassword← dictionary.pop()
res← CalculateResponse(pszMethod, pszDigestUri,
pszQop, pszUsername, pszRealm, pszPassword,
pszNonce, pszCNonce, pszNonceCount)
if res == pszTargetResponse then
return pszPassword
end
end
return null
Algorithm 2: An approach to retrieving a password used in HTTP
Digest Access Authentication
5.3 A phishing attack on the OffPAD
Assuming a trojan on the client, the address transferred to the OffPAD
cannot be trusted. Navigating to a phishing site, e.g. deployed in
Ukraine at http://paypa1.ua/, the Ukrainian address may arrive at the
OffPAD changed to the correct domain address https://paypal.com/.
The change may happen in (or en route from) the browser extension
handling the incoming authentication headers, or the phishing site may
actually embed the correct PayPal login screen on the phishing site,
invoking the OffPAD’s authentication routine for that server. Both
scenarios release a response value to the phishing site, which if not
protected well enough, may be vulnerable to exhaustive search attacks.
This is another argument for security controls beyond the OffPAD
device itself. If the password is properly protected, e.g. by key
derivation, which we discussed in sections 2.3.1 and 5.2, the complexity
of recovering the password from the response value quickly becomes
too large to handle.
5.4 Local collection of password
In the original HTTP Digest Authentication scheme, running on the
user’s computer, credentials are entered in the browser by keyboard. As
the keyboard signals travel from the keyboard to the application, they
are susceptible to surveillance on many layers (see figure 5.2):
1. The lowest-layer way to do keylogging is by collecting the signals
sent through the USB connector. This can be done by connecting
a hardware keylogging device between the USB socket of the
computer and the connector of the keyboard. Hardware keyloggers
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Figure 5.2: Locations where the password is vulnerable
store whatever keys are pressed in its own local storage. The
keylogger device must be collected later, and the data extracted
from the device. Being physical devices, hardware keyloggers have
a high risk of discovery.
2. Malware installed as an interim layer (hypervisor) between the
hardware and operating system has direct access to hardware, as
well as full control over how the operating system uses it. With
these abilities the hypervisor is able to on its own define how
the system should react to keyboard signals. The trojan can store
the typed keys and transfer them without alerting the operating
system.
3. Malicious drivers may also be installed in the operating system
layer, either by unwitting consent of an administrator or by a
falsely trusted and authenticated driver certificate.
4. A rootkit is malicious code that has gained root- (kernel level)
access, thus enabling access to hardware resources, including
the keyboard. Rootkits have the ability to hide while passively
collecting keystrokes.
5. API keyloggers exploit methods in the operating system for
listening in on keyboard signals. These usually introduce
significant overhead to the system, which may alert the user.
6. Every piece of information that is written on the keyboard and
presented in the system is loaded into memory. From here, one
could apply several data mining techniques for collecting credentials
information. One would look for passwords in the memory
context of a web browser login, and credit card numbers can be
validated by Luhn’s algorithm. In figure 2.4 we show how a
password entered during original digest authentication is exposed
in memory. Because of this, it is theoretically possible for an
attacker to isolate and collect the password at a compromised
machine.
7. Form grabbers are software that steals information from the
browser context. When entering information in a web form (e.g.
text fields for entering username and password), the content of
the form can be collected by intervening malware. An example
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implementation of a form grabber can be a benign looking browser
extension. Having access to the web page (the DOM), the trojan
may easily collect form data by walking through the appropriate
text fields.
5.5 Forced backwards compatibility (MITM)
Where most systems’ backwards compatibility with earlier versions can
be helpful for usability and error transparency, it has no place in an
authentication scheme. If the server decides (or is forced) not to set the
quality of protection field, both endpoints will roll back to RFC2069[8]
and be subjected to its weaknesses without the user knowing. As we
mentioned in section 2.5.7, our solution avoids this by not supporting
backwards compatibility.
5.6 Security architecture of the OffPAD
This is an introduction to the security architecture of the OffPAD. Below
we assess the possible threats presented in table 5.2, and comment on
what protective services can be implemented. Some, but not all of the
security services are implemented in the TazCard application.
# Threat Security services
1 Unauthorized disclosure of
identities
Device access control
2 Unauthorized use of device Authentication on device
3 Unauthorized use of unlocked
device
OffPAD session timeout
4 Creating false identities Phishing protection / server
authentication
5 Spoofing authentication Server authentication &
protection of response value
Table 5.2: Attack scenarios and protection mechanisms on the OffPAD
5.6.1 Attack scenarios
These scenarios apply to the TazCard OffPAD specifically.
1 - Unauthorized disclosure of identities
The original configuration of the TazCard provides low protection of
the file system. Given the device password, which is easily guessed, the
entire file system is readable via SSH. The authentication application
works with identities that are either
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(a) persistent, and stored either on-board (/data/midp/jstore/) or on
a MicroSD card(/sdcard/tazcard/).
(b) transient, created by the user before they are required, or upon
request. Such identities can be read from and written to supported
NDEF RFID (“contactless”) cards (see section 4.1.3).
In both cases, the stored identities (either on RFID or MicroSD card)
are stored in the ACL format from figure 2.9, which reveals the HA1
value. If a HA1 value is revealed, it can be used to calculate a working
response in the same way as the OffPAD.
A possible measure against this, which is not implemented, is to
encrypt the identities while stored. This could be done using a key
only accessible by the intended owner, perhaps derived from the device
master password, using a key derivation function. This attack scenario is
plausible, as getting hold of the identities is the most valuable objective.
2 - Unauthorized use of application
If a TazCard is stolen or used by an unauthorized person, there might
be attempts to perform authentication on the services that the device
has a relationship with. To counter this, the device’s user must be
authenticated to unlock an authentication session which in turn unlocks
the functionality of the TazCard, the user’s profile and access to his
identities.
3 - Unauthorized use of unlocked application
In the scenario above, if the device is unlocked by an authorized user
at the time of use, it can be abused to access all protection realms to
which the owner is authorized. The impact level of this abuse can be
reduced by introducing a session timeout on the device. This way, an
attacker has limited time to commit unauthorized actions. While he is
also able to modify and delete identities on the device, there is no direct
way for the attacker to recover the passwords on the device.
4 - Creating false identities
While authenticated to the device, an attacker may create or more “false
identities” on the device. Such an identity may be used to authenticate
to a phishing site, seemingly equivalent to another, to which the
authenticated user already has a relationship. The user may be lead into
believing that the web site to which he is automatically authenticated
is the correct one. Other phishing vulnerabilities are addressed by Kent
Varmedal in [41].
5 - Spoofing authentication
An attacker could either try to intercept and relay (MITM) real
authentication requests, or create false ones from a collected HA1
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or password. However vulnerable to interception, the information
communicated from the OffPAD to the computer is transient and usable
only once, between the correct endpoints and during a specified time
interval. Strong cryptographic protection of the transmitted response
value provides better protection of the contents of the response value
and thus its contents (HA1 and the password). For the man-in-the-middle
situation, server authentication is needed to avoid the client releasing
valid response values to malicious “middle men”.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and future work
6.1 Conclusions
In this report we have presented a method and device (the OffPAD)
for moving the operations of the authentication phase external to the
computer. This benefits the user in the following ways:
1. Management of credentials and calculations using these credentials
is done external to the computer. This means that clear text
passwords will never appear on the client computer and never be
revealed in its memory. Credentials are rather stored on the device
in the HA1 format. As an addition to the original MD5 hashing of
A1, we propose that the value is better protected in storage if either
the password is set to a random value, or protected by an iterative
or workload-adjusted key derivation function. These mechanisms
mitigate the vulnerability of password disclosure while stored.
2. Calculation of the critical values is done external to the computer.
This limits the availability to the critical values (the password
and HA1). The password itself is no longer a direct part of the
challenge-response protocol, and the HA1 value never leaves the
OffPAD. Doing the (passwordless) extended digest calculation on
the computer directly, one would never expose the password in
clear. However, as the HA1 value is still used in the calculation, it
must at some point be present in memory. As explained, HA1 is a
sensitive piece of credential data and may be replayed.
3. Transmission of the critical values is secured. We have shown that
today’s digest authentication scheme is insufficient in its protection
of the HA1 value, and presented in chapter 5 several ideas for
securing the communication of the scheme. We do not require or
assume any additional security on the communications link, such
as SSL/TLS or encrypted IP (IPSec).
4. User interaction is reduced, both in time and effort. The user
does no longer have to remember passwords for several accounts.
There is only one master password to manage, and all passwords
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used in the managed accounts’ credentials now reside in the HA1
value stored on the device. The credentials are applicable for low
assurance level accounts as well as high assurance accounts. Banks
or governments may issue their electronic identities on protected
smart cards for the user to store his proof of identity on the device.
In the security testing phase of the thesis work, we uncovered several
weaknesses, and pointed to where the original digest authentication
scheme requires modernization, i.e. where its protection mechanisms are
lacking. This led us to suggest improvements on how user credentials
are handled on the device, and the extension of the digest authentication
scheme, where we showed how user authentication can be done more
securely. As can be read in sections 6.2 and 6.2.7, there is still a lot that
remains to be done.
The OffPAD solution may be used as a standalone authenticator, or
alongside other mechanisms to complement a multi-factor authentication
scheme. The technology behind the scheme is not particularly advanced,
and does not differ greatly from its original HTTP Digest Access
Authentication scheme. This fact may leverage adoption of the scheme
by web services.
6.1.1 Research questions
Here we briefly recapitulate on the research questions raised in section
1.2.
1. What opportunities does the OffPAD offer?
The OffPAD provides a novel approach to automatic user
authentication and identity management. The user’s local
management of his own credentials is done on the external device
(OffPAD) rather than in the user’s brain. This provides users with
a more effective, less tiresome identity management, and quicker
authentication. The weakening requirement of having a password
that is easy to remember is now removed, as passwords can be
arbitrarily long. Thus the solution also adds to the security of the
scheme.
2. What has already been done in the field of local user-centric
identity management?
Several devices similar to the OffPAD exist, both in literature and
research. These are presented and discussed in sections 1.5 and
3.2.
3. What security requirements must be considered for a contemporary
user authentication scheme?
Extensive effort was put into describing the security requirements
for our system and to suggest improvements for the original HTTP
Digest Access Authentication scheme. We particularly considered
communication security, where the original scheme was lacking.
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Chapter 5 presents the requirements, issues and proposed solutions
to the scheme’s security related shortcomings.
4. What is the state of HTTP Digest Access Authentication?
Section 2.5.7 was written to address this question in particular.
Here we present the issue of brute force vulnerability and argue
why the scheme is still usable, with only minor modifications to
the password. Chapter 5 goes into detail on exploiting the findings
in section 2.5.7.
6.2 Future work
The research topics dealt with in this thesis (security; usability; identity
management; access control; etc.) are all popular research topics, and
are highly relevant to solving contemporary user authentication security
and usability issues. The concern of the user is often overlooked
by service providers in the planning and implementation phases of
identity management systems. The following is a presentation of ideas
for improvement, and new applications of the OffPAD, software and
research topics described in this report.
The security solution described in this report is applicable in many
situations. The original intention has been using the OffPAD as a
user-centric identity manager and authenticator, but the software can
easily be reduced or improved in many ways. Using the OffPAD’s
secure element, we can provide secure management and storage of data
that require protection services such as confidentiality and integrity, as
well as using the device as an external, hardened service for doing
cryptography and digital signatures.
New applications may require a stronger access control to the device
than what has been proposed in this report. We have not considered
any authentication of the local communicating entities in the scheme,
i.e. mutual authentication between the OffPAD and computer. In
such a scheme, the OffPAD may be registered to a trusted computer,
perhaps along the lines of the pairing suggested for the Pico by Stajano
in [35]. The OffPAD could keep a list of authorized computers, and the
computer may contain a similar list. For each interaction, or once per
session, the entities could authenticate to each other before the exchange
of credentials.
The OffPAD’s secure element facilitates operation in various fields. It
is capable of running cryptographic functions for information confiden-
tiality as well as storing symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic keys
as easily and secure as user credentials. Below are a number of sugges-
ted new applications for the OffPAD, and finally a recommendation for
further development of the applications.
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Figure 6.1: Using the OffPAD to facilitate seamless authenticated inter-
media handover
6.2.1 Automatic authentication on wireless AP handover
When a mobile user, either represented by Mobile Equipment (ME)
or a Mobile Station (STA) moves out of the range of an access point
(AP) or base station (BSC) but is still covered by another form of
communication technology to which that user is authorized access, the
ME or STA may automatically be approved access using the OffPAD as a
credential manager and authenticator for wireless media (see figure 6.1).
In theory, the automatic authentication mechanism is applicable to any
wireless technology (e.g. WLAN, WRAN and GSM). In particular, this
is an interesting application to the IEEE 802.21 standard [34] for media
independent handover in LANs and WANs.
6.2.2 Credit card payment
Online credit card payment ordinarily happens on vendors’ web sites,
or via a specialized payment service hosted by the card issuer. In both
cases the remote service collects the customer’s credit card information
from input done by the customer, to prove his possession of the credit
card. Many vendors also store this credit card information on their
systems for later use, and the convenience of their customers. We
believe that this storage and transfer of credit card details, however
well protected is unnecessary.
Using the same principles as in the presented extension of HTTP
Digest Access Authentication, a hash of the credit card details may be
used as the static value (HA1) in proving possession of a credit card.
This scheme would work particularly well in the situations where the
online transaction is done directly between the vendor and purchaser,
as the credit card information is already established at both locations.
For online payment facilitated by the card issuer, consider the
following scenario (with steps emphasized in figure 6.2):
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Figure 6.2: Challenge-response verification of credit card details
1. Upon receiving a payment request, the card issuer challenges the
client with a nonce.
2. The challenge is intercepted in the browser and passed to the
OffPAD. In the device, a digest calculation takes place, using
hashed static credit card information (outlined in the figure with
red (typed information) and blue (optically recognizable data)
frames) stored on the device, as the HA1 value. If there is no stored
HA1 value for the requesting credit card vendor (consider this the
realm), the data is transferred from the card. There are several
different ways to collect the information in steps 2.1 and 2.2, some
including physical changes to the OffPAD device, perhaps a camera
or card reader.
3. The response value calculated in step 2 is transferred to the
computer.
4. Still in the browser context, the computer forwards the received
response to the remote server.
5. The server validates the received challenge by doing the same
calculation locally with stored, correct credit card data. If response
corresponds to the result of the calculation, the payment is
considered authorized by the user and will be carried out.
6.2.3 Online banking
When logged in at an online bank, customers are often prompted to
re-authenticate themselves for the act of authorizing payments, signing
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contracts and agreements, etc (cf. the TOCTOU principle). As noted
in section 2.1.3, the authenticator software on the OffPAD may be used
for continuous (stateless) authentication to a web service. This may
be applied to the above scenario, as a less interfering substitute to
such re-authentication. The act of authenticating with the OffPAD (the
physical interaction) may be used as a means of re-authenticating the
user without the effort of entering a password.
6.2.4 Encrypted communication
Implementing encryption mechanisms such as RSA or AES on
an OffPAD is fairly easy. With implementations of asymmetric
cryptography, the OffPAD can sign e-mails and documents, and perform
encryption and decryption of data or point to point communication.
Plaintext may even be entered on the device itself, so that it is not
revealed in the memory of the connected computer.
6.2.5 Storage of cryptographic keys
The OffPAD may be used as storage for X.509 server certificates for
SSL/TLS communication, public keys for DNSSEC authentication oper-
ations, or keys for encrypted applications such as SSH. Implementing
an equivalent of the UNIX application dig (domain information groper)
combined with an authoritative DNS root public key, we can use the
OffPAD as an external, tamperproof validator of DNS data. We can also
use the device to validate digital signatures.
6.2.6 Local identity provider
OpenID or similar authentication frameworks may be implemented on
the OffPAD, to use as a local identity provider. Such an OffPAD user
identity may be used to authenticate the user to any service that support
OpenID.
6.2.7 Continuance of the thesis work
The identity management and authentication schemes we have de-
veloped and presented in this report are far from perfected. As the
TazCard development was suspended in favour of Android late in the
thesis work, a great deal of testing and adapting is required for a fully
functional OffPAD application for the TazPhone. Usability testing will
make it clear whether the proposed solution is desirably developed for
end users, and may uncover shortcomings, even with regard to security,
that have not yet been considered.
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Glossary
ACL The ACL is a list of authorizations. It describes the entities’ access
rights to protected objects. ACLs can be centric to users (i.e. an
entry per user, listing his or her access rights to objects), realms
(i.e. for each realm protected by the system, listing every entity
that is to be approved access) or objects (i.e. for each object, specify
what entities have access). 28.
Android Android is an operating system for mobile devices. It is based
on Linux and is the most popular smartphone platform.
Authentication Assurance Level The level of assurance the system can
have in the veracity of an identity when authenticated.
digest (also hash, hash code) The output of a hash function. 17.
hash See digest.
hash code See digest.
hash function A one-way function with specific properties. 17.
J2ME Java 2 Mobile Edition is a Java platform for mobile devices or
embedded systems.
MD5 The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm. 30.
MITM Describes the notion of an adversary somehow interfering,
either actively (modifying content) or passively (snooping), on a
communications channel. 25.
nonce A number used only once. 25.
realm Also protection realm. An environment in a computer network or
file system (e.g. a directory). 22, 33.
user agent An agent (i.e. software) that acts on behalf of the user.
Common user agents include web browsers, email clients and the
like. 33.
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Acronyms
AAL Authentication Assurance Level.
ACL Access Control List.
API Application Programming Interface.
HTTPd HTTP daemon (Apache HTTP Server).
J2ME Java 2 Mobile Edition.
KDF Key derivation function.
LUCIDMAN The Local User-Centric Identity Management project.
MAC Mandatory Access Control.
MITM Man In The Middle (attack).
MP-Auth Mobile Password Authentication [26].
OffPAD (mostly) Offline Personal Authentication Device.
OTP One-Time Pad, One-Time Password.
PAD Personal Authentication Device.
PIN Personal Identification Number.
qop Quality of Protection.
SSO Single Sign-On.
TOCTOU Time Of Check to Time Of Use.
TOFU Trust On First Use.
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Appendix A
Sample HTTP authentication
1 GET /hennikl/protected/index.html HTTP /1.1
2 User -Agent: Opera /9.80 (Windows NT 6.1; U; en) Presto /2.10.229
3 Version /11.61
4 Host: heim.ifi.uio.no
5 Accept: text/html , application/xml;q=0.9, application/xhtml+xml ,
6 image/png , image/webp , image/jpeg , image/gif , image/x-xbitmap ,
7 */*;q=0.1
8 Accept -Language: nb-NO,nb;q=0.9,no-NO;q=0.8,no;q=0.7,en;q=0.6
9 Accept -Encoding: gzip , deflate
10 Connection: Keep -Alive
11
12 HTTP /1.1 401 Authorization Required
13 Date: Thu , 02 Feb 2012 15:56:20 GMT
14 Server: Apache /2.2.14 (Unix) mod_ssl /2.2.14 OpenSSL /0.9.8j DAV/2
15 mod_wsgi /3.3 Python /2.5.2 PHP /5.2.9 mod_perl /2.0.4 Perl/v5.8.8
16 WWW -Authenticate: Digest realm =" protected",
17 nonce =" TEu8PP23BAA=cc9e2faafeff9a5aa8243ecfd18d93737fd6554f",
18 algorithm=MD5 , qop="auth"
19 Vary: accept -language ,accept -charset ,cookie
20 Accept -Ranges: bytes
21 Keep -Alive: timeout=5, max =100
22 Connection: Keep -Alive
23 Transfer -Encoding: chunked
24 Content -Type: text/html; charset=iso -8859 -1
25 Content -Language: en
26
27 GET /hennikl/protected/index.html HTTP /1.1
28 User -Agent: Opera /9.80 (Windows NT 6.1; U; en) Presto /2.10.229
29 Version /11.61
30 Host: heim.ifi.uio.no
31 Accept: text/html , application/xml;q=0.9, application/xhtml+xml ,
32 image/png , image/webp , image/jpeg , image/gif , image/x-xbitmap ,
33 */*;q=0.1
34 Accept -Language: nb-NO,nb;q=0.9,no-NO;q=0.8,no;q=0.7,en;q=0.6
35 Accept -Encoding: gzip , deflate
36 Authorization: Digest username =" hennikl", realm=" protected",
37 uri ="/ hennikl/protected/index.html", algorithm=MD5 ,
38 nonce =" TEu8PP23BAA=cc9e2faafeff9a5aa8243ecfd18d93737fd6554f",
39 cnonce =" Ke71i7tkVg/zOQnVsdke0ohLbHbkYksoaxvKszPve/l=", qop=auth ,
40 nc=00000001 , response =" c45d55ae3e724a0401362e5805396d5e"
41 Connection: Keep -Alive
1
2
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1 HTTP /1.1 401 Authorization Required
2 Date: Thu , 02 Feb 2012 15:56:25 GMT
3 Server: Apache /2.2.14 (Unix) mod_ssl /2.2.14 OpenSSL /0.9.8j DAV/2
4 mod_wsgi /3.3 Python /2.5.2 PHP /5.2.9 mod_perl /2.0.4 Perl/v5.8.8
5 WWW -Authenticate: Digest realm =" protected",
6 nonce =" F5MFPf23BAA=b8830c024b1b1333f089317aeffdf2ea09e8506f",
7 algorithm=MD5 , qop="auth"
8 Vary: accept -language ,accept -charset ,cookie
9 Accept -Ranges: bytes
10 Keep -Alive: timeout=5, max =99
11 Connection: Keep -Alive
12 Transfer -Encoding: chunked
13 Content -Type: text/html; charset=iso -8859 -1
14 Content -Language: en
15
16 GET /hennikl/protected/index.html HTTP /1.1
17 User -Agent: Opera /9.80 (Windows NT 6.1; U; en) Presto /2.10.229
18 Version /11.61
19 Host: heim.ifi.uio.no
20 Accept: text/html , application/xml;q=0.9, application/xhtml+xml ,
21 image/png , image/webp , image/jpeg , image/gif , image/x-xbitmap ,
22 */*;q=0.1
23 Accept -Language: nb-NO,nb;q=0.9,no-NO;q=0.8,no;q=0.7,en;q=0.6
24 Accept -Encoding: gzip , deflate
25 Authorization: Digest username =" hennikl", realm=" protected",
26 uri ="/ hennikl/protected/index.html", algorithm=MD5 ,
27 nonce =" F5MFPf23BAA=b8830c024b1b1333f089317aeffdf2ea09e8506f",
28 cnonce ="6 efQIR3nrDuh/PbgVBTTtpdS1jxLAuhduz4/BjTv+mV=", qop=auth ,
29 nc=00000001 , response ="27 cee959088126765c84b9715ca1086b"
30 Connection: Keep -Alive
31
32 HTTP /1.1 200 OK
33 Date: Thu , 02 Feb 2012 15:56:27 GMT
34 Server: Apache /2.2.14 (Unix) mod_ssl /2.2.14 OpenSSL /0.9.8j DAV/2
35 mod_wsgi /3.3 Python /2.5.2 PHP /5.2.9 mod_perl /2.0.4 Perl/v5.8.8
36 Authentication -Info: rspauth ="122194 f7da526d0aeebe1b684f3004d2",
37 cnonce ="6 efQIR3nrDuh/PbgVBTTtpdS1jxLAuhduz4/BjTv+mV=",
38 nc=00000001 , qop=auth
39 Last -Modified: Thu , 02 Feb 2012 15:40:20 GMT
40 ETag: "1e9e821 -3f-4 b7fd038b4584"
41 Accept -Ranges: bytes
42 Content -Length: 63
43 Vary: cookie
44 Keep -Alive: timeout=5, max =98
45 Connection: Keep -Alive
46 Content -Type: text/html
3
4
5
92
1. The server ( ) requests the user ( ) to authenticate, as it is
accessing an authorized only realm. The WWW-Authenticate header
field (highlighted) contains information for the user to decide what
credentials apply at the location (realm) and a value for avoiding
replay attacks etc. (nonce).
2. The user has now entered his credentials and by using the
information from WWW-Authenticate, the user agent/browser has
created the response value that is passed back.
3. Here the server again requests the user to authenticate; this time
because the credentials entered were erroneous. A new nonce is
generated for the user to try again.
4. The user now supplies a new set of credentials and a new response
is created.
5. The 200 OK from the server means that authorization is completed
successfully. The resource the user requested follows after the
header (not shown). Also, the Authentication-Info field contains
information about the past authentication.
data:image/png;base64,
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